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Summary
This thesis comprises four chapters dealing with issues regarding trade-o¤ between real
variables and ination under neo-Keynesian setting. The rst chapter uses a non-linearized
closed economy model to shows that in the long run there is a permanent negative trade-o¤
between ination and real output if Calvo type price adjustment speed is held exogenously
xed. The purpose of not linearizing is to look at long run levels, and not deviations from
the steady state, of ination and other variables. In this setting targeting zero level of
ination is shown to be the best option.
The second part of the chapter shows that for the natural rate hypothesis to hold
price adjustment speed has to be endogenous in the long run. The adjustment speed is
endogeneized through an assumption of imposing exogeneity on real output at its empirical
long run steady state equilibrium level. This generates a monotonic relationship between
long run ination level and price adjustment speed. The endogeneity of the adjustment
speed then ensures that at each level of ination there is no trade-o¤ between ination
and any other real variable as output is already exogenous. However, at levels of ination
lower than 0.5% there is a trade-o¤ between ination and real wages due to ine¢ cient
production. The unsatised natural rate hypothesis till ination level hits 0.5% is subject
to the near rationality hypothesis popularized by Akerlof. Since at all other points of
equilibrium there is perfect rationality and natural rate hypothesis is satised we treat this
model as the benchmark for evaluating the other models.
The second chapter shows that the inclusion of price adjustment cost into the model
endogeneizes the price adjustment speed as well as helps in relaxing the output exogeneity
condition of the benchmark case. The adjustment cost is estimated within the model at its
steady state and is found to be less than 1% of the total cost of production. The simulations
from the model show that the monotonic relationship between long run ination and price
adjustment speed helps in keeping the real variables, i.e., output and wage, very close to the
benchmark case from the rst chapter. The minor deviations are due to the price erosion
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e¤ect which results in keeping optimal price relatively higher, and the price adjustment
speed e¤ect which works opposite to the rst e¤ect. The ine¢ ciency at very low ination
levels as compared to the benchmark case is also improved in this case and it is possible to
target the long run ination level at as low as 0.2% per quarter. The minor deviations in
real variables and their degree of closeness not only satisfy the real rationality hypothesis
of Akerlof but also show why empirical papers on money neutrality fail to reject the null
hypothesis at low degrees of freedom.
The second part of this chapter uses Pakistans data to run the same simulations. This
sort of data from Pakistan has been made available for research for the rst time. The
results show that for a small developing country targeting the long run ination level as
close to zero as possible is the best policy. The reason is due to the prevalence of relatively
more monopolistic element in Pakistan and targeting a higher ination level would only be
of benet to them.
The third chapter focuses on Taylor (1980) pricing which unlike Calvo (1983) has a
xed time horizon and a discrete uniform distribution of price contracts. In order to
compute the price adjustment frequency equivalent to Calvo we use the average age and
average lifetime of price contracts concepts by Dixon and Kara (2005) who also claim that
Taylor and Calvo pricing schemes are similar qualitatively however they can be di¤erent
quantitatively. Using the discrete Taylor pricing scheme we show that it is subject to
long run trade-o¤ between ination and output when the contract length is held xed and
also the standard and benchmark models from both the pricing schemes are very close
to each other. Under price adjustment cost setting we found that the Taylor model is
output expansionary in nature as well experiences price adjustment inertia which grows
monotonically with ination. We also found that this model satises near rationality
hypothesis but the natural rate hypothesis is still questionable.
The last chapter extends Carvalho (2006) by incorporating dual heterogeneity, i.e.,
heterogeneity across sectors as well as over time in a standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) framework. By using the standard dynamic stochastic general equi-
vii
librium (DSGE) model, and pointing out that with such heterogeneity there are no closed
form solutions and thus no convergence, we conduct a numerical simulation exercise to
overcome these issues. We assume certain distributions for price adjustment speeds and
impose them across sectors and over time. As a result all sectors are randomly assigned
price adjustment speed parameter values at each point of time when they are hit with a
negative monetary shock. We show that dual heterogeneity result in sectoral impulse re-
sponse functions that are not smooth and can be aggregated into a single impulse response
function by using the law of large numbers (LLN). This aggregated impulse response func-
tion then showed relatively early convergence to the steady state as compared to the normal
impulse response function in cases of normal and uniform distributions. But when a biased
distribution was used, i.e., a positive distribution biased in favor of price stickiness the
convergence with dual heterogeneity was a little slower. These results conrm those from
Dixon and Kara (2010), i.e., the use of distributions can go a long way in explaining prices
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Plan of the Thesis
The convenient tractability and reasonable short run performance of time dependent pricing
models are their main motivations for use in so many macroeconomic models. There are two
types of such time depended models which are more common among the researchers, i.e.,
Calvo pricing models and Taylor pricing models. Calvo pricing models are continuous in
nature whereas the Taylor pricing models are discrete. Standard practice, of these models,
is to use xed price adjustment probability over time. This is a reasonable assumption
as under neo-Keynesian setup there can be short run e¤ects of changes in ination in
the presence of nominal rigidities and it has empirical backing too. The objective of this
thesis is to nd out if these, easy and useful, time dependent models are theoretically and
empirically sound in the long run under the neo-Keynesian setup as well.
The rst chapter develops a simple model with nominal price rigidity in the form of
Calvo pricing and shows that the empirically and theoretically propagated long run evi-
dence on existence of natural rate hypothesis is missed by the model. The model tends
to satisfy the natural rate hypothesis when the price adjustment speed is allowed to move
monotonically with the long run ination level. However, such endogeneity of price ad-
justment speed is achieved in a restrictive manner, i.e., by exogeneizing the output at its
steady state level which seemed to be the best instrument as compared to other options
available in our simple setup.
The rst chapter is linked to the second chapter which relaxes the xed output condi-
tion by introducing the xed price adjustment cost. The price adjustment cost has been
calculated to be even less than 1 percent of the total cost of production. This modication
has helped in making the long run results from our model much in line with the long run
evidence on existence of natural rate hypothesis. The minor di¤erences can be explained
by the existence of the principle of near rationality. Our main nding from Calvo pricing
models of chapter 1 and 2 is to target a minor level of long run ination is the optimal pol-
icy in the case of USA. However, when we calibrate our models for Pakistan, a developing
xii
country with much more monopolistic element as compared to, we nd that targeting zero
level of long run ination is the best solution. Doing so keeps the monopolistic element in
check as rms nd no incentive to hike up the prices.
The third chapter deals with Taylor pricing in its actual discrete form. The same
procedure is adopted as in the case of the rst two chapters. Taylor pricing contracts are
compared with the Calvo pricing probability using the Dixon-Kara framework instead of the
standard procedure which leads to miss-specication. The results show that endogeneity
of pricing contracts lead to satisfaction of natural rate hypothesis in the near rationality
sense, however, there is a good degree of inertia in Taylor pricing contracts as compared
to Calvo price adjustment probability at high levels of long run ination.
The fourth chapter breaks away from the standard literature, as in the rst three
chapters, on time dependent models and tries to utilize price setting distributions across
a cross section of rms. In response to a nominal shock the price adjustment speed is
allowed to change every period of time as well as over the cross section of rms. The only
restriction is the assumed distribution of price adjustment speed. The results show that
when an unbiased distribution is followed convergence of real variables to the steady state
is relatively faster.
As a whole, this thesis starts from the traditional setup of the Calvo pricing model,
provides with iterations based on a traditional concept of price adjustment cost, compares
the model outcomes of a developed country with those of a developing country, compares
Calvo and Taylor pricing contracts using a non traditional but more intuitive procedure,




The Calvo Pricing: Models with Exogenous and
Endogenous Price Adjustment Speed
1.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the speed of adjustment of prices in a neo-Keynesian model of sticky
prices. The speed of price adjustment is simply how much time the producer/rm would
take to adjust the price of its product. It is rational to expect that the price adjustment
speed should be faster if ination, that erodes prices, is higher and vice versa. However,
standard neo-Keynesian models (as also noted in Walsh, 1998) embodying sticky prices
such as Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980) do not satisfy the existence of such a relation
in the long run, where the price adjustment speed adjusts in accordance with ination.
This is because most of the variations of these models hold the price adjustment speed
to be constant over time. The outcome of no relationship between ination and price
adjustment speed results in forming a permanent long run trade-o¤ between real output
and ination. This result is problematic as it causes these models to not satisfy the natural
rate hypothesis, or money neutrality. This is an undesirable feature of these models where
in the long run nominal rigidities should not have real e¤ects, and in this case it is not
sustainable to follow an exogenous price adjustment speed when long run ination level
erodes prices more and more. The answer to this question is either to discard such sort of
exogenous pricing methods or try to come up with ideas to resolve this long run trade-o¤
issue.
The Calvo time dependent models do have their counterpart in terms of state depen-
1
2dent models which are based on more complex formulations. These are aimed at constant
re-evaluation of prices and the expected benets from the change, and then weighing these
benets from the costs of a price change to decide whether to actually change the price on
not (Woodford, 2003). However, Zabracki, et al. (1999) point out that it may not only be
the menu cost that is important but also the costs related to information collection and
decision making. Caplin and Leahy (1994) and Dotsey, et al. (1999) are good examples of
state dependent pricing models. Also Woodford (2003) notes, apart from being mathemat-
ically challenging and data intensive, while these state dependent complex models certainly
have better micro-foundations they have not performed relatively better than the simple
and more tractable time dependent pricing models.
In time dependent models, prices adjust after a period of time, making it possible for
the prices of di¤erent vintages to co-exist at one point of time. This class of models are
more tractable and hence, have been more popular. The results from these models over
the years have been useful in studying a variety of macroeconomic issues. So, due to their
tractability advantages it is not a futile e¤ort to resolve the long run trade-o¤ between
output and ination and make these models consistent with the neo-Keynesian theory.
Since the exogeneity of the price adjustment speed makes the models insensitive to varying
long run ination levels, the issue can be resolved if some monotonic relationship between
these two can be established so that the price adjustment speed changes along with the long
run ination target. It is interesting to see if the price adjustment speed is endogeneized
so that its value can be determined from within the model in response to changes in long
run ination level then would the real output be stable around its steady state value at
each point of equilibrium.
The long run trade-o¤ between a real variable and ination has been under scrutiny
for quite some time now as in the long run one expects neutrality of money, that is in
the long run a monetary shock a¤ects only the ination rate, and not the real variables
such as output. There is reasonable empirical support favoring the existence of natural
rate hypothesis or neutrality of money in the long run. Some important results are Fisher
3and Seater (1993), Gweke (1986), McCandless and Weber (1995), and King and Watson
(1997). However, neo-Keynesian models with xed adjustment speeds predict a persistent
real e¤ect.
In this chapter I rst use the Calvo pricing contracts in a neo-Keynesian environment to
see the long run e¤ects when the random draw probability of revising the pricing contracts
is xed. This means that all the rms would revise prices after they get a random signal and
the probability that a rm receives a signal in a period of time is xed or exogenous, i.e., it is
not related to ination level. This standard assumption of the random signal is unrealistic
yet very convenient in simplifying the analysis of equilibrium ination dynamics due to
its ability to reduce the size of the state space required to formalize the characteristics of
the economy. So, at all ination levels the price adjustment probability remains the same
resulting in the undesirable trade-o¤ between long run ination level and output to exist.
There are two sources for these real e¤ects that would be reviewed in this chapter:
1) Mark-up distortion; and
2) Price Variation distortion.
Since neo-Keynesians consider monopolistic competition, producers can charge a mark
up above their cost of production. When mark-ups are very high they indicate a greater
monopolistic element in the market and vice versa. The higher the mark-up, higher would
be the mark-up distortion and more would be the production level held back from its
optimum level in case of xed adjustment probability for prices.
Price variation distortion is the degree of price di¤erence that exists between the vintage
prices and the new price set by a rm which is allowed to change its price. This distortion
results in all producers producing di¤erent quantities of output even though their marginal
costs match. At an aggregate level, doing so, and not producing same level of output, leads
to ine¢ cient production in terms of producing less with the same level of input.
After studying the impact, resulting from the above distortions of the exogenous price
adjustment speed on the real variables of the model we want to see if endogeneity of
the adjustment speed can help restore the natural rate hypothesis hence setting aside the
4criticism of Calvo type staggered pricing models by making them theoretically consistent
both in the short run and the long run.
1.1.1 Literature Review
Some early applications of Calvo (1983) pricing include Yun (1996), King and Watson
(1997), King and Wolman (1996), and Goodfriend and King (1997), Gali and Gertler
(1999), and Sobordone (2002) who nd the optimal value, based on the mark up, for prices
to remain unchanged is 9 months which then translates into price adjustment probability
of approximately 0.3. Getting a view of the empirical side, Lach and Tsiddon (1992) stud-
ies Israels ination episodes of the late 70s and early 80s with the conclusion that rms
adjust their prices more frequently in higher ination environment than in the lower ina-
tion environment. Golosov and Lucas (2007) also found that price adjustment frequency
signicantly reduces in a low inationary environment as compared to the high inationary
environment. Bils and Klenow (2004) use the data collected on prices of 75,000 individual
items by Bureau of Labor Statistics. They nd that the exibility of prices varies a lot
depending upon the type of good or service. Some goods such as gasoline, airfares and
fresh non durable products saw change in prices almost every month, whereas newspapers,
taxi fares and vending machines had prices changes much infrequently. They conclude that
the median duration of prices was from 4 to 7 months. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)
looked at the detailed data on items included in the CPI as well as PPI from 1988 to 2005.
They nd that the temporary price cuts play a big role in frequent prices changes espe-
cially for durables such as apparels and furniture. They nd the median duration for all
prices to be in between 4 to 5 months. Literature review of some of the earlier studies such
as Carlton (1986), Cecchetti (1988), Kashyap (1995), and Blinder et al. (1998) provide
reasonable evidence to conclude that price stickiness is more important than evident in the
later micro level studies by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
However, it is important to know that these studies relied much on the prices given in the
merchantscatalogues and hence are prone to be relatively more sticky.
5The price adjustment speed impacts both the mark-up and price variation. A relatively
higher adjustment speed would reduce the magnitudes of both the mark-up distortion as
well as the price variation distortion. This would be easier understood by an extreme
situation, e.g., when price adjustment speed is either unity or zero where then the aver-
age mark-up is equal to the static mark-up of a monopolistic competitive rm and price
variation disappears. So, a higher ination should be accompanied with a higher price
adjustment speed in order to reduce the impact of the two distortions for the production
to stay e¢ cient. But that is not possible when price adjustment speed is exogenous. As
long-run ination level rises both the distortionsmagnitudes also become larger and as
a result there is a permanent trade-o¤ between output and ination. Existence of such a
long-run trade-o¤ under neo-Keynesian setting has been pointed out in quite a few papers.
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000), Kiley (2002), Devereux and Yetman (2002), Graham
and Snower (2004), Bakhshi et al. (2003), Casares (2004) and Ascari (2004) all point out
that the neo-Keynesian long run Phillips curve turn out not to be a vertical one due to the
existence of the trade-o¤ between ination and some other real variable.
The basic question, after endogeneizing price adjustment speed, is to see if the natural
rate hypothesis is being realized or not. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) have dened
near rationality, which they believe exists instead of pure rationality and they explain it
in terms of price adjustment speed. They show that at very low long-run ination levels
prices do not get revised very soon as this low ination is being under weighed by the
producers while making price adjustment decisions. Whereas, when the long run ination
is at a higher level, producers start adjusting prices more quickly. So price setting becomes
extremely rational as ination rises. In this sense rationality is increasing in the level
of ination. Devereux and Yetmen (2002) use the same concept of near rationality while
nding that menu cost models with endogenous price adjustment reduce the impact of long
run nominal variables on the real ones. Kiley (2002) nds similar results as well. However,
exogeniety of the adjustment speed induces a trade-o¤ between ination and output which
then can be minimized if the adjustment speed can be endogeneized, i.e., it readjusts given
6the level of long run ination. We use the term minimization of the trade-o¤ between
ination and output because the endogeniety of price adjustment speed does not always
mean that ine¢ ciency would disappear but it reduces it to such an extent that it comes
very close to zero. Similar are the ndings by Friedman (1969), Geweke (1986), and Fisher
and Seater (1993). They also found that the statistical tests for testing the existence of
the long run neutrality have very low test powers since the alternative is extremely close
to the null hypothesis.
1.1.2 Methodology
I use a simple neo-Keynesian model with Calvo pricing. The usual procedure is to evaluate
the dynamic outcome from this time dependent model with stable long run ination level
and a xed (exogenous) price adjustment speed. The dynamic analysis is usually carried
out by log-linearization around the steady state and then studying the deviations from the
steady state in the form of impulse responses arising due to a shock. The convergence path
of the impulse response is then of interest to the researcher, i.e., how soon the deviation from
the trend diminishes hence, eroding the impact of the shock. However, this approach leaves
no scope to evaluate monetary policy based on the long run ination level as linearizing
around the steady state does not preserves non-linearities. This also does not study the
impacts in levels rather than only in deviations. Thus the usual techniques do not address
whether the steady state remains the same in the long run or it can change. Devereux
and Yetman (2002) conducted a similar exercise of endogeneizing price adjustment speed
on the menu cost model and have reported results in levels as well. Since comparison and
evaluation is to be made with the results from Devereux and Yetman (2002) it is better to
have a similar specication as well. I would then proceed to see if the simple Calvo pricing
model exhibits a permanent trade-o¤ between long run ination and output or not. This
link is mostly missing in literature because usually the studies are focused on the short run
only. As a result of which the natural rate hypothesis seems redundant because under the
neo-Keynesian set up it only matters in the long run and does not hold in the short run.
7For this purpose I calibrate the model using USA data from 1985-2005 on quarterly basis.
Since the natural rate hypothesis or, in this case, money neutrality has an empirical
basis as mentioned above, this result can be used as a way to think about endogeneizing
price adjustment speed. This result means that long run real output is independent of
ination. So, using the independence of long run output, I exogeneize it at its run steady
state level. This ensures that no matter what the long run ination target becomes the
real output would remain invariant to it and the producers have to adjust accordingly for
steady state equilibrium, i.e., by adjusting their price adjustment speed so that both the
distortions mentioned above are controlled/minimized as the long run ination target goes
higher. The monotonic relationship between ination and price adjustment speed, as a
result, implies that in order to stabilize output at its steady state value, the equilibrium
would only occur if price adjustment speed varies with movements in long run ination. It
would be interesting to see, how the two distortions perform in this setting and does the
monotonic relationship between long run ination and price adjustment speed provide with
any useful policy implication. And also does it satisfy the neutrality hypothesis strictly or
in the sense as shown by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) in terms of near rationality.
The literature on optimal ination shows that zero ination is optimal as it is welfare
improving under a xed price adjustment speed regime; see King and Wolman (1996). The
use of standard models thus support Fishers zero long run ination target rule. In this
chapter I will show that the similar result exists while studying ination in levels. However,
when the ination level is relatively just a little higher than zero, it causes ine¢ ciency as
the magnitudes of both the distortions start getting larger. So in this case having zero
ination would be the best choice. However, when an exogenous condition of xing output
at its long run equilibrium level is brought in, it endogeneizes the price adjustment speed.
I then show that when the price adjustment speed monotonically adjusts with every level
change in ination, targeting zero long run ination is not welfare improving or e¢ cient
because at this level of ination average mark-up is higher than the static mark-up in a
monopolistic competitive setting. So targeting a moderate level (relatively a little higher
8level) of ination is actually benecial as then the price adjustment speed rises which then
helps in bringing the average mark-up to a lower level equating it to the static mark-
up. This may induce slightly higher price variation but the magnitude is not such as to
undermine the e¢ ciency gain due to reduction in average mark-up. Hence, the overall
welfare gain is more than at the zero ination level.
1.1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter in terms of its outcomes are as follows:
It has been shown that a simple Calvo model of price setting, without any menu cost
rules, with exogenous price adjustment speed shows a long run permanent trade-o¤between
ination and output. Up to date it has been recognized that this long run trade-o¤ exists
but there is no reference to quote that has shown the existence of this trade-o¤ in a really
simple manner. Also, the benet of using the simple model in the beginning is that when
the speed of adjustment is endogeneized the model can serve as a benchmark as it exhibits
neutrality of money at all long run ination levels except those very close to zero.
Secondly, the above result also helps in proving that the zero ination rules such as
those put forward by Fisher are not optimal in this case and a small yet positive level of
ination can be welfare enhancing in terms of better e¢ ciency. The intuition is that the
price of adjustment increases reducing the pricing distortions.
Lastly, with output exogeneized, the price adjustment speed starts to have a monotonic
relationship with long run ination. This relation, and due to it the change in attitude of
producers with which they adjust prices in the new environment needs to be checked if it is
in accordance with the near rationality preposition of Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000).
I show that at very low levels of ination prices are sticky because many producers nd
no need to change their prices and those few who change prices set their prices relatively
much higher as they know that most of the producers would not be interested in revising
prices. However, this autonomy of the price adjusting producers becomes limited when
due to higher levels of ination targeting price adjustment speed also becomes high. Now
9more producers are a¤ected by the impact of ination and decide to adjust quickly bringing
down the degree of mark-up as well. So, even though output is never disturbed in this
case, the monotonic relationship between price adjustment speed and ination here proves
the existence of near rationality.
1.2 A Model of Closed Economy
I construct a closed economy model with representative agents in a monopolistically com-
petitive setting. The utility of the agent depends upon consumption, leisure and monetary
holdings whereas it supplies labor to the producers. The producers, in turn, produce
goods and decide about prices they want to charge depending upon their monopolistic
power. Price adjustment is styled as in Calvos (1983) methodology where only a xed
proportion of rms are randomly selected every period of time to decide upon the level
of prices they want to set for their goods which has to last till the time these rms get
randomly selected again to adjust their prices.
1.2.1 Household







where  is the utility discount factor, ct is the aggregate consumption per capita, lt is
leisure, mt denotes money balance and Pt is aggregate price level. Thus, mt=Pt gives the















The above utility function is based on constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The use
of CRRA utility function is simple because it always keeps the degree of intertemporal
substitution stable (given by ; ; ; and  are all between 0 and 1) and also always keeps
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marginal utility positive and the separability helps in keeping the impact of one argument
separate from the other. The use of separable CRRA utility functions are quite common in
modeling household and production both in simple time dependent1 and more complicated
state dependent DSGE models2.
Time endowment is normalized to one which is split between work h and leisure l:
1 = ht + lt (1.2)
There is a continuum of heterogeneous consumption goods ci distinguished by the index








where ; which follows 0 <  < 1; is the substitution elasticity.
With heterogeneous goods, the aggregate price level is a composite of prices across
various goods. At time t, household receives income from the following:
(i) the real wage wt from work;
(ii) real dividends (dt) from stock holdings;
(iii) zero coupon bond payment (bt); and
(iv) money carried from the previous period (mt 1).
There are three ways to transfer purchasing power across periods: zero coupon bonds,
stocks, and money holdings. The zero coupon bond matures in one period. For one unit
of zero coupon bond carried from the previous period, it pays one unit of real goods at the
current period. Therefore, the cost of buying bt+1 units of zero coupon bond is its future
payo¤ (that is bt+1) divided by the its real rate of return (Rt) at time t where Rt is the
market interest rate adjusted for ination.
1Most of the papers mentioned in literature review have models with CRRA based utility functions.
2Smets and Wouters (2007).
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There are heterogeneous producers producing heterogeneous products. Each issues
stock in the nancial market. Let si;t denote the share holding of the household of the
stock issued by producer i 2 [0; 1], and di;t be the real dividend per unit share. Then
total dividend income that a household receives at time t is
R
di;tsi;tdi. At each period, a
household receives dividend rst and decides his stock holding for the next period. Given
the unit price zi;t of stock i, his cost on stock i trading is equal to zi;t (si;t+1   si;t). The total
stock trading cost is therefore
R
zi;t (si;t+1   si;t)di. With the presence of heterogeneous
goods, there are heterogeneous prices for consumption good.
Let Pi;t denote the price of good i. Therefore, the total consumption expenditure isR
Pi;tci;tdi.



















Because of a representative consumer setting, every consumer will end up with the
same stock share holding. For ease, if the number of total consumers is considered to be
just one, then the market equilibrium must have the stock price adjusted to si;t = 1 for all
t. Therefore, I can ignore the stock investment decision and treat total market dividend
income Dt =
R
di;tdi as an exogenous income to the household. The consumption problem
can be solved in two stages. The rst stage is to choose a nominal total consumption
expenditure stream3 fCtgt ; distinguished from real consumption by its capital letter. The
second stage is to choose consumption for each good i at each given period with Ct treated
as exogenous. In other words, the second stage is to choose fci;tgi to maximize the real
aggregate consumption (1:3) subject to
R
i Pi;tci;tdi = Ct. I show in the appendix that
there is an optimal aggregate price index which, combined with Ct, provides su¢ cient





Based on the above discussion, heterogeneity index i can be suppressed and the house-
holds intertemporal budget constraint remains as follows:










The left hand side of the above budget constraint shows the four sources of income to
the household and the expenditures are on the right hand side.
The optimization problem is solved through the following Lagrangian where for sim-











wtht +Dt + bt +
mt 1
Pt
  bt 1Rt   mtPt   ct

+tt (1  ht   lt)
377775 (1.6)
The rst order conditions with respects to ct; lt; ht; bt+1 and mt are:
ct : c
 
t   t = 0; for t = 0; 1; ::;1 (1.7a)
lt : l
 
t   t = 0; for t = 0; 1; :::;1 (1.7b)
ht : wtt   t = 0; for t = 0; 1; :::;1 (1.7c)





    t + Ett+1 PtPt+1 = 0; for t = 0; 1; :::;1 (1.7e)
Money Demand
The standard money demand function, as derived from the above rst order conditions,













Further simplication by substituting for t; Ett+1 (which results in dropping o¤ the











The above shows that real money demand is an increasing function of consumption
but a decreasing function of nominal interest Rtt+1 (note that R is real interest and 
is gross ination, i.e., t+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
). Such specication of gross ination is standard in
macroeconomic literature. For example, see Sobordone (2002) and Bakhshi et al. (2003).
1.2.2 Producers
Pricing
With CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregation of consumption, each producer
i has some market power. For producer i, he faces a non-horizontal market demand ci;t (as













The demand for i commodity co-moves positively with real aggregate demand ct, but
negatively with its relative price Pi;t=Pt (relative to aggregate price index). If rms are
allowed to set prices each period, then exible price setting guarantees a constant mark-up
over its real marginal cost
 
denoted as  i;t

which follows Pi;t=Pt =  i;t=. The mark-up
is 1=. The higher the substitution elasticity, the higher the competition (the larger the )
across heterogeneous products, consequently lower would be the mark-up. The presence
of market power thus implies monopolistic nature of the market and as a result there is
production ine¢ ciency in the economy which is referred to as mark-up distortion.
There is nominal rigidity in price in the model following Calvo (1983). In each period,
among all rmsregardless of their producer index i only  fraction are allowed to reset
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their prices. In other words, a 1    fraction are charging the same price as what they
charged in the previous period. Consequently, there are prices of di¤erent vintages of each
subsequent period in our economy. Some prices are set one period ago, some two periods
ago, and some three periods ago, etc. It is assumed that a symmetric equilibrium exists
such that di¤erent rms with the same price vintage charge the same price. This means
that we can categorize heterogeneous rms by either their heterogeneous products or by
their price vintages. For the convenience of discussion, subscript i is used to distinguish
producers of di¤erent products, and subscript k to distinguish producers of di¤erent price
vintages.
Given the price adjustment probability , at each time t, there is  fraction charg-
ing P0;t,  (1  ) fraction charging P1;t,  (1  )2 fraction charging P2;t, etc. Recall


















Let Pk;t=Pt be qk;t which indicates the relative price level of a k vintage rm here. With








where t  Pt=Pt 1 is the ination at time t. The above equation shows the relation-
ship between ination (); price adjustment speed () and zero-vintage relative price (q0).
When the price adjustment speed is exogenous there exist a positive relationship between





0;t + (1  )1k=0 (1  )k P =(1 )k;t 1
 (1 )=
, and P =(1 )t = P
 =(1 )
0;t +
(1  )P =(1 )t 1 : Divide both sides by P =(1 )t :
1 = ~q
 =(1 )
0;t + (1  )=(1 )t is obtained where t  Pt=Pt 1:
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ination and zero-vintage relative price, i.e., with rising ination level rms adjust their
prices such that the relative price is also higher than at lower levels of ination. This results
in higher magnitudes of both mark-up distortion and price variation distortion. However,
when the price adjustment speed is endogenous it positively co-moves with ination result-
ing in making it possible for the price adjusting producers to set relatively lower relative
prices, i.e., prices closer to the aggregate price level in response to rising ination. So,
both the distortions in this model get smaller as ination rises under the endogenous price
setting speed.
The pricing problem that rms are facing is a little more complex than in a static
model. In each period, a rm charging a price of k vintage receives nominal prot:
k;t = (Pk;tck;t   Pt	k;t) (1.12)
where 	 is the real total production cost. It is assumed that all rms face the same constant
returns to scale (CRS) production function:
yk;t = atHk;t (1.13)
where H is the labor demand and at is the exogenous marginal productivity of labor. In
this model, labor is the only input for production. This implies that real average cost is
equal to real marginal cost, and the real marginal cost is:




which is independent of the price vintage and is same for all the producers. So for the
economy to be e¢ cient all producers should produce at the same level of production. But
despite same marginal cost the mark-up and price variation distortions cause producers
to produce di¤erent levels of output given at what level of vintage price distribution they
stand at.
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Combining real marginal cost (1:14) with demand function (1:9) gives the real prot
k;t  k;t=Pt for the producer and it can be expressed as:
k;t =  (qk;t; wt; at; ct) = (qk;t    (wt; at)) ck;t (1.15)
where the real prot is a positive function of relative price as well as consumption/demand
and a negative function of marginal cost (or wage and productivity).
Optimal Pricing
Let the problem be dened recursively Xt = (wt; at; ct) [Xt+1; i.e., the producers try to
maximize the expected value of their recursive value function which depends upon market
wage rate wt; productivity at; and aggregate consumption ct: For a rm that can change its
price, its value function is denoted as V0. And for a rm that can not change its price and
faces a k vintage price, its value function is denoted as V1 (qk;t) : The Bellman equations
that solves the value functions-and hence the optimal pricing-for the two above mentioned
representative rms are:





+ (1  )V1 (q1;t+1;Xt+1)
35
9>>>>=>>>>; (1.16)
V1 (qk;t;Xt) =  (qk;t;Xt)
+Et
24 V0 (Xt+1)
+ (1  )V1 (qk+1;t+1;Xt+1)
35 (1.17)
for k=1; 2; ::::
The price adjusting producer in (1.16) maximizes his relative price givenXt = (wt; at; ct)
as well as discounts for the future both in case if he again is allowed to change his price
in the next period by probability  or otherwise face the probability of not being allowed
to adjust 1   : The non-price adjusting produces in (1.17) considers his prot given his
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vintage relative price and discounts the future similar to the price adjusting producer.






It shows how the relative price of a price-rigid commodity decreases with ination. In
easier words this expression shows how rising ination level depreciates the relative price
q0;t k over time.
Proposition When a rm is allowed to set a new price at period t, it will set the relative






















where Qt;t+k = 1=1k=1t+k:
Optimal pricing condition (1:19) suggests that when there is no productivity growth, in
the steady state (where wt = w; at = a; and ct = c) if the ination rate is zero (i.e., t = 1
and Qt;t+k = 1), the equilibrium markup is 1= which is the same as a exible pricing
economy. Under this circumstance, zero ination targeting can produce an equilibrium
outcome mimicking a exible pricing economy. The derivation of (1:19) is given in appendix
B.
Output
For each k vintage producer, given his relative optimal price setting at time period k as




Here the output yk;t is a positive function of aggregate consumption and a negative function
of relative price qk;t. As the relative price goes higher for the kth good its output falls due
to the fall in its demand.
It is important to note that aggregate price index ensures that real aggregate output is











From (1:13) the labor demand for a k vintage rm is Hk;t = yk;t=at:The aggregate labor
demand is Ht 
P1





(1  )k (qk;t) 1=(1 ) (1.22)
which shows that aggregate labor demand is a positive function of consumption ct and a
negative function of relative price denoted by qk;t above. This is obvious because as the
relative price of k goes up, demand for it reduces and so does the demand for labor for the
production of k and in aggregation too.
Prot
Due to the lack of any investment decision that a rm has to make, the prot is distributed
as dividend among the share holders. The real prot in each period for a producer of i












yk;t which is equal to
P1
k=0 (1   )kq =(1 )k;t ck;t: And
according to the denition of optimal pricing index
P1









1.2.3 Market Clearing Conditions
To close the model the following clearing conditions for the bond market, money market,
and labor market should hold:
For bonds market:
Bt+1 = bt+1 (1.24)
Since there is no scal policy concern in our model, in equilibrium we take Bt = 0 for
all t so bt = 0 holds as well. This is because bonds are issued by the government to cover its
scal decit. For simplicity and focus on the monetary aspect of an economy, i.e., long run
ination targeting, it has been assumed that the government manages a balanced budget
which is standard in literature.







and for money market the market clearing condition is:
Mt+1 = mt+1 (1.26)
1.2.4 Equilibrium
I rst dene an endogenous price system.below:
Denition An endogenous price system consists of positive sequences of
Rt; wt; fqk;tg1k=0 ; t; t
	1
t=0
and an initial price level P0:
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The equilibrium of the model can be dened as:
Denition We take as an exogenous sequence f t+1g1t=0 : We also take M0 = m0 as
given.
Equilibrium is a collection of endogenous variables which consists of:
(i) an endogenous price system stated above;
(ii) a sequence of household controlled variables fct; lt; ht; bt+1;mt+1g1t=0 satisfying (1:7a)
to (1:7e);
(iii) household budget constraint (1:5)and the time endowment constraint (1:2);
(iv) a sequence of producer controlled variables fyk;tg1k=0 ; fHk;tg1k=0 ; fdk;tg1k=0 ; q0;t where
q0;t satises (1:19) ;
(v) each k vintage rm produces according to (1:20) with vintage relative prices fqk;tg1k=1
evolving according to (1:18);
(vi) labor demand Hk;t is dened by the inverse of production function (1:13);
(vii) dividend dk;t is dened by (1:23);
(viii) a sequence of government variables fBt+1;Mt+1g1t=0 satisfying the market clearing
conditions (1:24), (1:24) and (1:26);
(ix) and nally there is a labor market clearing condition (1:25) and an ination-pricing
trade-o¤ equation (1:11) to respect.
1.3 Steady State Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium along the balanced growth path is used to match the U.S.
data series so as to pin down the model parameters at their long run averages. There is no
shock to the economy in the steady state. Technology progresses at a constant rate such
that at+1=at = g.
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1.3.1 Household
The households are optimizing their consumption, leisure and asset accumulation streams
such that the rst order conditions (1:7a); (1:7b); (1:7c); (1:7d) and (1:7e) as well as the
budget and time constraints (1:5) and (1:2) all hold in the steady state. The time subscript
now can be dropped from the above mentioned rst order conditions and constraints.
1.3.2 Producers
With proper arrangement, after substituting real marginal cost function (1:14) into the



























Along the balanced growth path at+i=at = wt+i=wt = ct+i=ct = g: So the optimal pricing
along the balanced growth part takes the following form:








1   (1  ) 1  g
1   (1  ) 1(1 ) g
!
(1.28)
The above equation (1:28) implies that optimal pricing for the price adjusting rm/producer
is a function of both ination and price adjustment speed in the steady state. The rel-
ative optimal price becomes time invariant and the time subscript is dropped as above.
The extreme right term in parenthesis is not less than one indicating that the price of the
zero-vintage rm is higher than the exible pricing mark-up, hence the output produced
by this producer is less than what it would be under exible pricing with static mark-up
1=:
Aggregate labor demand can be linked to aggregate output as well based on the rst-




t , and according to (1:2): And
ht = 1   lt = 1   w 1=t c=t where ct = yt: It is ne to take  = 1 so that the growth of
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wt and ct will still keep labor supply constant in the steady state. So, in the steady state
labor supply can then be expressed as:
Ht = 1  (ct=wt)1= (1.29)
Also since qk;t = Qt k;tqo;t k, in the steady state, Qt k;k =  k and qo;t k = qo: So,
qk;t = qk = 








which shows a marginally negative relationship between zero-vintage price q0 and labor
demand. If q0 keeps on rising then the price adjusting rms would start producing lesser








For the dividend distribution, by looking at the real prot function of the k vintage
rm which is  (qk;t;  t; ct) = (qk;t    t)q 1=(1 )k;t ct in the steady state, after applying the
evolution process linking qk to q0 according to (1:18), we obtain  (qk;  ; ct) = ( kq0  


















(1  )1=(1 ) < 1 so that the innite sum exists.
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1.3.3 Market Clearing Conditions in the Steady State
The three market clearing conditions now become:
mt = Mt; (1.33)
Ht = ht; (1.34)
bt+1 = 0 (1.35)
1.3.4 Equilibrium in the Steady State:
Denition Given a constant ination  and constant growth rate a t+1=at = g, the
steady state equilibrium is a solution of fct; lt; ht; bt+1;mt=pt; t; t; q0;Ht; Pt; Rt; wtg that
satisfy:
(i) households rst order conditions (1:7a) to (1:7e)subject to the budget constraint
(1:5) and the time endowment constraint (1:2);
(ii) production decisions (3:9), (1:30) and (1:32); and
(iii) market clearing conditions (1:33) to (1:35) :
1.4 Ine¢ cient Production and the two Distortions
1.4.1 Ine¢ cient Production due to Mark-up Distortion
Since e¢ cient level of production requires all producers to produce with same labor input
then it should ensure that the real wage is set at marginal product of labor for the com-
petitive labor market. All rms, therefore, face same average cost of production. Please
see (1.14). In case of price stickiness under the xed adjustment speed rms try to achieve
the highest possible level of mark-up when they are given the opportunity to adjust prices
hence moving the average mark-up level higher than the static mark-up at zero ination.
This then disturbs the balance between wage and marginal product of labor as now produc-
ers facing di¤erent vintage prices are producing di¤erent quantities and charging di¤erent
mark-ups. However, exible labor market always clears in equilibrium but the result is
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lower than the e¢ cient level of production. In the presence of the exogenous price ad-
justment speed mark-up continues to goes up as the long run ination rises widening the
undesirable trade-o¤ between output and ination.
1.4.2 Ine¢ cient Production due to Price Variation Distortion
Under price stickiness there is price variation amongst producers of di¤erent vintages facing
di¤erent demand curves, which then results in using di¤erent levels of labor by these
producers. When, under the exogenous adjustment speed setup, ination level rises in
(1.30), the price variation component becomes larger, however the mean price may remain
the same, resulting in relatively lower aggregate demand for labor and consequently lower
wage rate. This is because under monopolistic competition rms produce di¤erentiated
goods which are not fully substitutable. So when some producers raise prices a part of
their output lost due to lesser demand is not being compensated by the output of other
rms. However, still the labor market clears but with lower marginal and average wage
rate. So same number of agents is now producing lesser output in aggregate by using the
same amount of labor input as before, but only cheaper in price.
1.5 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we pin down model parameters based on the long run behavior of
the quarterly time series data for the United States from 1960 to 2005 in order to obtain
the relationships of interest, i.e., trade-o¤s between ination and wages; and ination and
output, and relationships between ination and zero-vintage relative price; ination and
labor demand; and ination and price adjustment speed. The variables thus used for such
estimations are given in the appendix. The calibrated parameter values are given in table
1.1 below whereas the details are in the tables in appendix C:
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Table1.1: Calibrated Values of Model Parameters
Parameter Value
 0.984 (translates into quarterly return of 1.6 %)
 0.8 (which results in a static mark-up 1= of 1.25)
 0.6 (degree of substitution between leisure and labor)
 1 (consumption and wages grow at the same rate)
a 1 (average productivity is assumed to be uniform)
g 1.008 (in the long run it is 0.8 % growth per quarter)
l 0.81 (standardized leisure time)
h 0.19 (standardized work time)
 1.01 (long run ination of 1 % per quarter)
 0.25 (average price length of 4 quarters)
The equilibrium of the model exists at the long-run ination level  = 1:01 with price
adjustment speed/probably pinned down at  = 0:25: It is important to note that under
Calvo pricing that the expected duration of an individual rms price spell is 4 quarters or
one year but that is not true for all the rms as a whole. In chapter 3 we show that under
Taylor pricing contracts a xed number of rms change prices every period of time and
their next turn comes after one cycle of price adjustments has elapsed. This leads to the
average duration of price spell across all rms to be 7 quarters which in this case is also the
individual rms average. Since the signal allowing for price adjustment is random under
Calvo pricing, it is important to note that the average duration of price spell across all
rms is not the same as it is for our representative rm. Empirically, some prices are more
exible than the representative rm while some others can be very sticky in nature. The
steady state equilibrium gives the optimal price of a price setting rm to be at q0 = 1:02: It
is to note that the calibration results also match the parameter values used in the common
literature mentioned in the literature review. The model is highly sensitive to the values of
 and ; whereas it almost exhibits no change in response to changing values of  between
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0 and 1:5:
1.5.1 Standard Calvo Model with Fixed Price Adjustment Speed
The standard Calvo model with xed price adjustment speed  = 0:25 is solved using the
calibrated parameters. The gures 1.1(a, b, c, and d)7 below show the model outcomes of
real wage rate w=a; real output y=a; zero-vintage relative price q0; and labor demand Hd in
response to various levels of long run ination : These trade-o¤s and relationships between
ination and other mentioned variables would help in pinning down how the e¢ cient output
level is missed when price adjustment speed is xed, what is the role of the two distortions,
and why in this case targeting zero ination is the most e¢ cient solution in this case.














w/a: real wage rate
Fig. 1.1a: Real wage rate and ination under Calvo
exogenous price adjustment speed
7On these gures and those in the second and third chapters every point on the graph represent a steady
state equilibrium. The question here is if this equilibrium is upto the optimal level, i.e., the long run steady
state level obtained from the calibration.
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 y/a: real aggregate output
Fig. 1.1b: Real output and ination under Calvo exogenous
price adjustment speed















Fig. 1.1c: Relative price q0 and ination under Calvo
exogenous price adjustment speed
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Fig. 1.1d: Labor demand and ination under Calvo
exogenous price adjustment speed
Since the frequency of price adjustment in a standard Calvo price setting is exogenous,
higher ination results in higher price variations as explained in the section above on price
variation distortion. This results in all rms hiring di¤erent labor inputs and producing at
di¤erent levels according to their demand curves which results in ine¢ ciency in production.
This ine¢ ciency here due to price variation distortion is the level of lower output with same
aggregate labor demanded at all ination levels but this is not evident from gure 1.1d
where demand for labor is also falling along with falling output in gure 1.1b. This is due
to the existence of the second distortion. From zero-vintage relative price q0 movement in
gure 1.1c it is clear that as the long run ination level goes up marginal mark-up goes
up. The price adjusting rms try to be as ahead of the aggregate average price as possible
in order to mitigate the future price erosion e¤ects if they do not get a chance to reset
prices soon in the future. Since the mark-up has also gone up, it results in producers
with relatively newer prices to produce less resulting in less aggregate labor demand under
higher long run ination. As the mark-up distortion dominates in this case real wages
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come down. This domination is smaller in magnitude until  = 1:025 but afterwards its
magnitude becomes really very high.
Figure 1.1d shows that labor demand is getting lesser with consequently higher long
run ination. It is because rms are not producing at a single level economy wide as the
rms with newer prices produce less than the ones with older prices. This results in lower
aggregate labor demand and the wealth e¤ect on the household results in bringing the real
wages down as well.
The level of zero-vintage relative price, as well, shows both the degree of price-variation
distortion and mark-up distortion. When it moves positively with long-run ination, as in
the standard Calvo model, it enhances the magnitude of both the distortions.
The output contraction result, as in gure 1.1b, in response to higher long run ination
in time dependent results has also been discovered by Graham and Snower (2004) by using
Taylor wage contracts who conclude that long run ination is output contracting except
only in a mild ination regime. Casares (2004) studies the e¤ect of mark-up distortion,
due to long run ination, on output and similar output contracting results are obtained
by testing di¤erent versions of pricing models with exogenous price adjustment speed.
Devereaux and Yetman (2002) also found that targeting a slightly higher than zero level
of long run ination is plausible.
Now the objective is that what level of ination should be targeted in order to have
e¢ cient output and no long run trade-o¤ between output and ination. Since both price
variation distortion and mark-up distortion start rising as long run ination level rises
above zero ination, in such price setting behavior only zero ination would provide the
best outcome. At zero long run ination level the average mark-up is equal to the static
mark-up below which the mark-up cannot go due to the reason that relative price never
comes down due to ination. Also it is the only point that would result in use of same labor
input by all the producers as price variation would not exist. As the level of ination rises
both the distortions start playing their roles in bringing down the output by inculcating
ine¢ ciencies and as a result the permanent long run ination-output trade-o¤ becomes
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more and more in magnitude.
1.5.2 Calvo Model with Endogenous Price Adjustment Speed (Benchmark
case with Exogenous Real Output)
As it is evident from the literature in the rst and second sections of this chapter, prices are
not as sticky as assumed by having a xed price adjustment probability and also targeting
zero ination, in reality, is not a very practical measure. Therefore, I simulate the standard
Calvo model, but I exogeneize the real output level at its long run equilibrium level for
USA which corresponds to long-run ination =1:01 and price adjustment speed  = 0:25:
As also explained under the methodology, exogeneizing real output is helpful because it is
the real variable being disturbed by nominal movements in ination in case of exogenous
price adjustment speed. But if it is exogeneized then the possibility of its trade-o¤ with
ination disappears. Now for the model to be in equilibrium with respect to di¤erent
long run ination targets price adjustment speed has to change in the same direction as
ination. Since endogeneity of the adjustment speed has been achieved without adding any
external friction, such as menu cost, this is the simplest possible procedure and as a result
a benchmark model is formed where there is no long run ination-output trade-o¤ except
at ination level very close to zero (explained later). The best advantage is that it would
be feasible to study if the rms follow Akerlofs near rationality hypothesis along with the
evolution of the two distortions. Doing so with such simplicity has not been recorded in
the literature yet.
There are other procedures available as well that can lead to endogeneity of price
adjustment speed. Exogenizing real wage would be the other possibility but output has
been prefered because the long run trade-o¤ we are interested in this thesis is between
ination and output. Another possibility is xing the money supply, however, the nature
of this research is not to understand the monetary aspects of an economy. In simple
words, the purpose of this research is to understand how rms would react to changes in
ination in the long run if they aim to follow their steady state growth path, i.e., simply
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maintaining the steady state level of output. The validity of this argument is credible
when any policy maker tries to understand the relationship between ination and output
in the long run. For him it is not wrong to assume that the rms control their output but
have to compete for wages in the labor market and cannot be less protable than their
competitors for long periods of time. So exogenizing the output is like xing the long
run internally controlled state of the rm on basis of which the rm then decides how to
manage the externally inuenced levels of labor, wages, price adjustments and prots in
response to the level of long run ination targeted by the government. Also when talking
about sustained economic development, apart from other aspects, steady level of growth in
output is its major contributor. This highlights the importance the steady long run output
level from the national level policy making perspective as well.
When the output stands exogeneized it endogeneizes the price adjustment speed : In
order to understand how the relationships between long run ination and other variables of
interest develop it is benecial to review the steps involved in simulation of these relation-
ships. When the output level is exogeneized at its steady state the labor demand (1.30)
is now determined on basis of comovement between price adjustment speed  and optimal
relative price q0 in response to di¤erent levels of long run ination : This is easy for the
steady state level as the values for  and  are available. For the labor demand to equate
with labor supply (1.29) we need the steady state wage rate which is pinned down by
equating the optimal pricing equation (1.28) equal to the ination pricing trade-o¤ equa-
tion (1.31). This wage rate is then used in the optimal pricing equation (1.28) to determine
the relative optimal price q0: The value for the wage rate w is also used to determine the
labor supply from equation (1.29). Since labor demand equals labor supply for the labor
market to clear, by putting in the values of q0 and  in equation (1.30) and equating it to
the labor supply provides with the optimal value for the price adjustment speed : Over
a varying range of long-run ination, with exogenous output, di¤erent values of optimal
 are generated showing a monotonic relationship between ination and price adjustment
speed. The relationship of ination with other variables also keep on varying as the price
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adjustment speed keeps on moving with changes in levels of long run ination. Apart from
the monotonic relationship between ination and price adjustment speed, other variables
(which include relative optimal price q0 and labor demand) have negative relationship with
ination. As for the real wage rate w there is an initial negative relationship but after 
exceeds 1:005 natural rate hypothesis or neutrality is restored in the long run. The gures
and details are given below whereas appendix E lists the simulation procedure.
For the equilibrium to exist, following conditions must hold:
(1  )1=(1 ) < 1;(1  )=(1 ) < 1;(1  )1=(1 ) < 1;(1  )=(1 ) < 1;
And since  < 1;  < 1 and  > 1 in our model8, the only condition that is then binding
is
(1  )1=(1 ) < 19:
What is observed is that with the endogenous price adjustment speed the e¢ ciency of
production is improved, i.e., over time real wages and hence labor demand remains stable
in response to rising ination levels (see g. 1.2a and g. 1.2d). However, at very low
ination levels, i.e., below  = 1:005 there is a large ine¢ ciency in production. When
ination level rises above zero ination, where only the static mark-up applies, the price
adjustment speed (see g. 1.2e) also start rising. Since the vintage price distribution
is endogenous now, rise in long run ination level results in bringing down the average
mark-up but the signicant reduction only occurs when   1:005. This is evident from
g. 1.2c where the zero vintage relative price falls moderately in response to rising long
run ination level (i.e., for   1:005). Hence, prices tend to be very sticky under very
8 < 1 represents long run dis-ination which is not a topic of discussion here.
9Since probability is between zero and one, it is equivalent to  > 1   1=(1 ):
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low levels of ination and consequently there exists ine¢ ciency in production. The reason
is that at such low levels of ination, adjusting rms select very high mark-ups, however
the average mark-up may go down given the large number of non-adjusting rms with
vintage mark-ups of eroding nature. This mark-up distortion results in reducing demand
for labor and real wage as only a very small number of rms adjust prices resulting in
lower demand for aggregate labor and consequently lower aggregate wage level due to the
wealth e¤ect at household level. The more labor available due to the wealth e¤ect of wage
reduction is then employed by rms with older vintage prices to ll the very small gap in
exogenous output created by the few adjusting rms. So the xed output production is
met but in an ine¢ cient way. Here Akerlof, Dickens and Perrys (2000) proposition of near
rationality holds, i.e., at ination levels very close to zero, in this case   1:005; results
in keeping prices quite sticky because for as small as up to 0.5 percent of ination most of
the producers are indi¤erent to adjust prices or not. Figure 1.2e also shows the same.
The only possible way to achieve e¢ ciency is to target slightly higher level of ina-
tion after which the number of price adjusting rms is higher and their price adjustment
distribution helps in employing lesser labor input resulting from a more uniform level of
production across rms. Also at this stage, along with the reduction in mark-up there is
also a simultaneous reduction in price variation distortions magnitude which automatically
results in lowering the demand of labor and hence the real wage rate.
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Fig. 1.2a: Real wage rate and ination under Calvo
endogenous price adjustment speed




















Fig. 1.2b: Real output and ination under Calvo endogenous
price adjustment speed
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Fig. 1.2c: Relative price q0 and ination under Calvo
endogenous price adjustment speed




















Fig. 1.2d: Labor demand and ination under Calvo
endogenous price adjustment speed
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Fig. 1.2e: Endogenous price adjustment speed  and ination
under Calvo endogenous price adjustment speed
Reduction in mark-up with rising long run ination is entirely due to the reason that
when price adjustment speed is endogeneized it moves monotonically with ination. At
long run ination levels very close to zero the adjustment speed is very low as well and just
a small fraction of rms revise prices with heavy mark-ups creating huge price variations
as well (resulting in ine¢ cient production using lot of labor). But the high degree of mark-
ups when not desirable can be dealt with the endogenous adjustment speed which provides
the incentive to the price adjusting producers to keep reducing mark-ups because if they
keep them high then any new adjusting rm can always take the benet of protability
by adjusting its price with relatively a lower mark-up and attracting a part of the demand
of a substitutable product. This also automatically results in lowering price variation as
rms try to move in accordance to each othersbehavior as well as the concept of near
rationality is being followed according to which more and more rms decide to adjust with
rising ination target. At ination levels higher than the long run equilibrium level rms
keep producing the same amount of output with almost similar amount of labor at all
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points ensuring that e¢ cient production level is achieved.
In this case targeting zero ination is not justies as output can be produced more
e¢ ciently than it can be produced at zero ination level. However, maintaining long run
ination in moderate limit, i.e., above  = 1:005 and around  = 1:01 is the best option
available as at this level exogenous output level has been met for the rst time using the
labor input at the least possible marginal/average cost and the same trend then continues
at higher levels of ination. At these higher levels of ination both mark-up and price
variation distortion may exist but they both have so little magnitudes that their real
e¤ects on labor, wages, and relative price are of no signicance. Whereas the existence of
Akerlof, Dickens and Perrys (2000) near rationality is evident throughout.
For comparison between standard Calvo and standard Calvo with endogenous price ad-
justing speed please see gures in chapter 2 ahead where all the Calvo models are compared
with each other. It is evident that before long run equilibrium level there is ine¢ ciency
in the model with endogenous price adjustment speed as compared to the other and as
ination level rises the other model with exogenous price adjustment becomes more and
more a¤ected in terms of output. Also important to notice is that around the steady state
equilibrium level, i.e., around ination level  = 1:01 the distance between real wages, real
output and labor demand from both the models is not very signicant hence proving that
the econometric tests checking the real e¤ects of ination have only very limited power.
Another insight, mentioned implicitly earlier, is that degree of monopolistic competition
provides an idea about the optimal level of long run ination. If the degree of monopolistic
competition is higher then targeting a higher level of ination is more desirable because at
lower levels there would be relatively more price stickiness and hence as a result existence
of both mark-up and price variation distortions with higher magnitudes. In the specic
case for the USA the long run level of ination near   1:005 indicates such a point in
accordance to her degree of monopolistic competition. In general terms, if there is a higher
monopoly power, then if there is a slightly higher ination target, then the monopolistic
rms would charge the highest possible mark-up as well as would create the highest possible
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degree of price variation by adjusting prices high every time an opportunity is granted to
adjust prices. On the other hand, keeping the long run ination target relatively lower
would control this action of the rms.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter it has been explicitly shown, through a simple neo-Keynesian macroeco-
nomic model, that the xed nature of pricing contracts under Calvo pricing results in a
permanent trade-o¤ between real output and ination in the long run hence falling short
of the natural rate hypothesis. This is the questionable feature of such models as empirical
and theoretical studies, which are also discussed in the literature review, are supportive of
the neutrality of money in the long run.
In order to make the Calvo model long run consistent theoretically I exogeneized the real
output at its steady state value for USA. Then it has been shown that if price adjustment
probability is allowed to be endogenous the real e¤ect or the trade-o¤ between ination
and output is no more except at ination levels below 1.005. Above that level of ination
neutrality of money holds in the long run as well as ination   1:005 becomes the optimal
level for long run ination targeting instead of  = 0:
The ine¢ ciency in production due to the mark-up and price variation distortions be-
come negligible at all ination levels above  = 1:005 and also the rmsdecision making
regarding price adjustments follow Akerlofs near rationality hypothesis.
Lastly, the model with endogenous price adjustment speed would serve as a benchmark,
of course for ination   1:005; to evaluate the outcome of the xed adjustment cost model
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Calvo Model with Price Adjustment Cost and an
Illustration: Pakistan
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it has been shown that the exogeneity of the price adjustment
speed results in a permanent longrun trade-o¤ between ination and real variables and
having a long-run target of zero ination is optimal in such setting. However, when the
price adjustment speed is let to be endogenous in the benchmark case the optimal ination
target was higher than zero as well as the monotonic relationship between long run ination
and price adjustment speed helped in satisfying the natural rate hypothesis at all long run
ination levels except below 0.5% per quarter.
In this chapter, I focus on a more general model. The model is similar to the one in
the last chapter but it includes a price adjustment cost. The cost of price adjustment is
determined from within the model and it is extremely small as compared to the cost of
production. The price adjustment speed still follows Calvo pricing and both the adjustment
speed and real output are endogeneized in this model. The presence of the small price
adjustment cost not only generates enough stickiness at lower levels of long run ination but
also allows for greater exibility to adjust prices when long run ination is quite high. The
natural rate hypothesis, in its strict sense, is not satised but when the results are compared
with the benchmark case from the previous chapter the di¤erences between the two is so
marginal that it can be considered as negligible as it has been in some of the empirical
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studies testing long run money neutrality10. On the other hand, at ination levels lower
than 0.5% per quarter, where the benchmark case su¤ered from production ine¢ ciencies,
this model performs much better making it possible to target long run ination as low
as 0.2% per quarter. The existence of monotonic relationship between ination and price
adjustment speed and the marginal deviations from the benchmark case are in line with
the Akerlofs near rationality hypothesis as well.
The illustration of a small developing country, i.e., Pakistan has been included which
apart from the above ndings also shows that when there is more monopolistic element
coupled with a large labor force then targeting the long run ination level as close as
possible to zero ination is optimal.
2.1.1 Outline
The second and third sections cover some of the literature on menu cost models and the
contributions of this chapter respectively. Section four covers the model specication with
price adjustment speed as well as its analysis. Section ve looks at the simulation results of
the model as well as its comparison with the normal Calvo pricing model and the benchmark
Calvo pricing model from chapter 1. Section six illustrates the same results for Pakistan
and section seven concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The use of price adjustment cost, most commonly know as menu cost, is not new. Mankiw
(1985) points out:
"The act of changing a posted price is certainly costly. These costs include such items
as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price. Yet these "menu" costs
are small and, therefore, generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these
xed-price models. But small menu costs can cause large welfare losses. The claim that
10References are mentioned in chapter 1 where econometric tests fail to negate the non-existence of
monetary non-neutrality in the long run.
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price adjustment costs are small does not prevent them from being central to understanding
economic uctuations."
Dixon and Hansen (1997) argue that the relevance of menu cost models can be revived
by modifying the traditional assumption that all industries have the same structure. With
heterogeneous sectors some monopolistic, some competitive the possibility arises that
even with low elasticity of labor supply, the level of menu costs in a mixed economy needed
to lead to monetary non-neutrality can be small. Also following a monetary expansion, the
ratio of social welfare gains from price rigidity to prot forgone for the monopolistic rms
can be up to 200 times larger than in the standardmodels. The implication is that the
importance of menu costs may be signicant in real world economies.
The use of adjustment cost in an economy with xed pricing contracts would actually
result in even more persistent long-run ination and output trade-o¤ as pointed out by
Devereaux and Yetman (2002). They nd that if price adjustment speed is endogeneized
in the presence of menu cost then the natural rate hypothesis or neutrality of money is
satised. However, the near rationality idea in Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) is central
to this result. Menu cost here works as to introduce near rationality into the standard
model. At very low levels of ination rms might nd it unimportant to pay the cost
and adjust prices but when the ination level is relatively higher then the benet of price
adjustment would exceed the cost of price adjustment. This is similar to the idea that
the cost of near rationality is increasing in the level of ination, and price setting will be
increasingly rational as ination rises. This may be the reason that Geweke (1986), and
Fisher and Seater (1993), trying to establish long-run neutrality have very low test powers
since the alternative is extremely close to the null hypothesis. On the theoretical front
Caplin and Spulber (1987) nd the same result. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) also nd
that menu cost models are able to replicate the empirical fact that the frequency of price
increases covaries strongly with ination, whereas the frequency of price decreases and the
size of price increases and price decreases do not.
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2.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are as follow:
The inclusion of adjustment cost in the standard long run model (with variables at
levels) with Calvo pricing contracts endogeneizes the price adjustment speed. The cost
of price adjustment estimated from within the model is even less than 1% of the cost of
production and even with this small adjustment cost good degree of price stickiness is
generated at lower levels of long run ination and vice versa for higher levels of ination.
Secondly, the inclusion of menu cost is similar to having near rationality built in the
model which then satises the natural rate hypothesis in the long run, i.e., as ination level
rises price setting decisions become more and more rational. This enables the authority
to target minor ination levels slightly above zero. It would be shown in this chapter that
the lowest optimal long run optimal target can be as low as 0.2% per quarter.
Thirdly, an illustration has been included in the end. The case study of Pakistan has
been made possible for the rst time using the historical labor force data which was not
available earlier. It will be shown that in an economy with good deal of monopolistic ele-
ment targeting long run ination as low as possible is the optimal policy as higher ination
levels would only benet the monopolists. This is similar to the nding of Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) also mentioned above.
2.4 Model of an Economy with Fixed Price Adjustment Cost
As mention above, the model from the previous chapter is extended to include xed price
adjustment cost, in this regard the model setup almost remains the same except for the
maximization of value functions by the producers. For the ease of ow of the model and
consistency important parts of the model setup from the rst chapter are stated below:
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2.4.1 Household
The households optimization problem is solved through the following Lagrangian where
the rst term is its utility function, the second term is the budget constraint and the third
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The producers aim at maximizing their prots. Given the CES aggregation of consump-














terms of aggregate consumption ct: Due to monopolistic competition producers enjoy a cer-
tain degree of monopoly power so when they set their prices they ensure a certain constant
mark-up 1= above their real marginal cost given by  k;t =  (wt; at) =
wt
at
, i.e., the ratio
between real wage rate and the marginal productivity of labor. The pricing follows Calvos
(1983) formulation, i.e., since every period a fraction of the rms change their prices, as a
result in the market at a time there are several prices of di¤erent vintages and can be ag-
gregated in accordance to CES pricing index which is Pt =








The production function exhibits constant return to scale yk;t = atHk;t where Hk;t is the
labor input. Combining real marginal cost with the demand function gives the real prot
k;t for the producer expressed as:
k;t =  (qk;t; wt; at; ct) = (qk;t    (wt; at)) ck;t (2.1)
44
which shows that the real prot is a positive function of consumption and real marginal
cost whereas it is a negative function of relative price qk;t:
Value Functions
At any time t, the value of a rm depends on its price vintage. This results in the involve-
ment of two value functions, i.e., one for the rm which has seen the random signal and is
allowed to change its price and one for the rm that is not allowed to do so and follows the
vintage price. For a rm that is allowed to change its price, its value v( t; yt; ), which is a
function of its real marginal cost  t, real output yt (or consumption ct since the denition
of the aggregate price index ensures that output is always at the level of aggregate con-
sumption) and price adjustment probability , follows the Bellman equation (where time
subscripts are condensed to depict the steady state):
v( ; y; ) = max
q0
(q0;  ; y) +  [v( ; y; ) A] + (1  )vf (q1;  ; y; ) (2.2)
(2.2) shows the value of a price adjusting rm. The second term  [v( ; y; ) A] gives
the discounted expected value of price adjusting rm net of the xed adjustment cost, A,
whereas the third term (1 )vf (q1;  ; y; ) gives the discounted future production value
of the rm when it does not adjust its price and hence pays no adjustment cost.
Similarly, for a rm that can not adjust its price and faces a k vintage price tag, its
value function vf (qk;  ; y; ) is:
vf (qk;  ; y; ) = (qk;  ; y) +  [v( ; y; ) A] + (1  )vf (qk+1;  ; y; ) (2.3)
where the rms prot is the function of its vintage price qk as well. Here  [v( ; y; ) A]
shows the discounted expected value of the rm net of its adjustment cost price A for the
period when the rm would adjust its price whereas the term (1 )vf (qk+1;  ; y; ) gives
45
the expected value for facing the vintage price qk for one more period of non-adjustment
time.
2.4.3 Optimal Adjustment Probability
The optimal pricing rule in the steady state always follows:
q0 =  
1

 1  (1  )

1  g
1  (1  ) 11  g
(2.4)
This rule is the same as derived in the previous chapter. According to this rule, rms
maximize there expected zero vintage relative price q0 when they have to adjust their price
which is governed by adjustment probability : Here the maximization problem is solved
in two stages, i.e., rst the rms decide what adjustment probability to choose as now
there is a xed adjustment cost associated with each price change, and in the second stage
rms use that adjustment probability to maximize their price q0: Therefore, each rm has
to choose  optimally given that it maximizes its value function.
In the situation described above a producer can select such an adjustment probability
 that can maximize his long-run production value. So each representative rm solves the
following optimization problem for choosing :
max

 (v  A) + 1k=1(1  )kvf (qk) (2.5)
subject to (2:4) and the recursive relationship between prices of di¤erent vintages qk =
 1qk 1: The above objective function represents the average of all statuses of the producer
in the long run future.
Proposition 5 The objective function  (v  A) + 1k=1(1   )kvf (qk) is equivalent to
the following objective function11:








The above objective function has a clear economic meaning. For the term 1k=0(1  
)k(qk); it represents the long run expected prot that a rm can get at the steady
state under various price vintages. For the term A, it is the expected adjustment cost
to pay at each period at the steady state. The expected prot net of adjustment cost in
the steady state is 1k=0(1   )k(qk)   A: The present discounted value of such an
expected net prot stream is the value divided by 1  . The producers have to select an
adjustment probability that maximizes the above objective function and with this value
for  probability they can then adjust their prices.
2.4.4 Fixed Adjustment Cost
With the denition of the prot function (q) = (q    )q 1=(1 )y (as obtained by sub-
stituting for c from the demand function) and the recursive relationship across the prices


























Since the rms maximize the objective function subject to the price adjustment prob-
ability, we take derivative of (2:7) with respect to the price adjustment probability  and
solve it for xed adjustment cost12. The xed price adjustment cost A is calculated to be
0.0164 at the equilibrium long run ination level of 1.01 and price adjustment probability
0.25 in the steady state. If cost to output ratio Ay is computed at the steady state it turns
12As the optimal price q0 is also the function of price adjustment speed , the envelope theorem is applied
for the derivative.
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out to be only 0.8 percent of the cost of production for USA.
2.5 Relationships under Fixed Adjustment Cost Setting
The equilibrium in this case is a bit di¤erent when it comes to the producer who now faces
the xed price adjustment cost of a price change as well. Just to have clarity we dene the
equilibrium below:
Denition Given a constant ination  and constant growth rate a t+1=at = g, the
steady state equilibrium is a solution of fct; lt; ht; bt+1;mt=pt; t; t; q0;Ht; Pt; Rt; wtg that
satisfy:
(i) households rst order conditions subject to the budget constraint and the time en-
dowment constraint;
(ii) production decisions (2:6), (3:9), (1:30) and (1:32); and
(iii) labor, money and bonds market clearing conditions.
Figure 2.1e shows the long run relationship between price adjustment probability and
ination where the adjustment probability increases with long run ination. At ination
level of 11.2 percent per quarter all producers decide to adjust their prices each period
of time by incurring the xed adjustment cost, i.e., the price adjustment probability 
becomes 1 or prices get fully exible. If gures from 2.1a to 2.1d are looked at it becomes
clear that there are two distinct parts to discuss, one is till the ination level of 5 percent
and the other is for ination levels higher than 5 percent. In the rst part ination is long
run contracting for real wages, labor demand and output however it is expansionary in the
second part where ination is higher than 5 percent.
The backward bending pattern in the gures below is not observed both under standard
Calvo price setting and under Calvo pricing with exogenous output which is the benchmark
case. Here the pattern can be explained by gure 2.1c. Ination has two e¤ects on zero-
vintage relative price q0: The rst one is price erosion e¤ect which means that the higher
the ination faster would be the speed of erosion of the vintage sticky price. As a result
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when a rm decides to adjust its price, to counter the price erosion e¤ect, it keeps its
optimal price relatively higher. The second e¤ect is the price adjustment speed e¤ect.
When under endogenous price adjustment speed setting higher ination level translates
into higher price adjustment speed that decreases the magnitude of di¤erence between
various vintage prices hence shielding the producer up to some limited level against the
price erosion e¤ect. And as a result it decreases the zero-vintage or the optimal price.
Figure 2.1c shows that in the beginning price erosion e¤ect dominates resulting in higher
levels of optimal price meaning that they include mark-ups higher than the static mark-up
1= applicable at zero ination level due to the monopolistic competition setting. And when
the price adjustment probability level doubles to up to 0.5 from the long run calibrated
level of 0.25 percent price adjustment speed e¤ect starts to dominate creating the backward
bent in q0: And when ination reaches above 11 percent there is only the price adjustment
e¤ect as all prices change every period and as a result equilibrium mark-up becomes equal
to the static mark-up 1=:




















Fig.2.1a: Real wage rate and ination under Calvo pricing
with adjustment cost
49




















Fig.2.1b: Real output and ination under Calvo pricing with
adjustment cost




















Fig.2.1c: Relative price q0 and ination under Calvo pricing
with adjustment cost
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Fig.2.1d: Labor demand and ination under Calvo pricing
with adjustment cost
From gures 2.1a and 2.1b it can be seen that in the rst part, i.e., up to 5 percent
level of ination, real output and real wages fall. Here the results are quite similar to the
standard Calvo model. The price variation distortion results in di¤erent levels of production
by the producers of di¤erent vintage prices and those rms which are adjusting prices try
to charge mark-ups higher than the static mark-up of 1= = 1:25: As a result real output
falls resulting in a decrease in demand for labor thus mark-up distortion here dominates
the price variation distortion. Due to the wealth e¤ect coming from higher ination labor
supply rises bringing down the real wage rate.
When price adjustment speeds e¤ect starts to dominate in the second part, i.e., above
ination level of 5 percent, real output becomes expansionary. As the higher price adjust-
ment probability results in the reduction of mark-up and price variation distortions which
compacts the distribution of price vintages. In simple words the di¤erence between old
and new prices become smaller and producers start generating closer to similar levels of
output and charging mark-ups closer to and might be equal to the static mark-up. The
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increase in output results in higher labor demand and consequently higher wages as can
be seen in the gures above. This evidence is in line with both Akerlofs near rationality
hypothesis as well as the result of Nakamura and Steinnson (2008). In fact the adjustment
cost depicts near rationality here.

























Fig.2.1e: Price adjustment speed  and ination under Calvo
pricing with adjustment cost
Standard Calvo model, Endogenous adjustment speed Calvo model with exogenous
output and Calvo model with xed adjustment speed are compared in gures 2.2a, 2.2b,
2.2c, 2.2d and 2.2e below.
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Fig.2.2a: Real wage rate and long run  (Calvo pricing
comparison)




















Fig.2.2b: Real output and long run  (Calvo pricing
comparison)
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Fig.2.2c: Relative price q0 and long run  (Calvo pricing
comparison)























Fig.2.2d: Labor demand and long run  (Calvo pricing
comparison)
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Fig. 2.2e: Price adjustment speed  and long run ination
(Calvo pricing comparison)
It is easily observable that the trends of all models in terms or real output and real
wages are extremely close to each other near our calibrated empirical long run steady state
where the level of ination  = 1:01. Real output and real wage remain this close only
up till a small range of ination and then their contracting path starts under standard
Calvo model. However, the paths of both the models with endogenous price adjustment
probability remain very close throughout till ination levels last steady state in observed at
 = 1:11. It is the long run equilibrium steady state where all rms under xed adjustment
cost and almost all rms in the benchmark Calvo models change their prices every period.
This result shows that adding a very small adjustment cost relaxes the much restrictive
assumption of exogenous output yet provided result very close to the ones under exogenous
output which for this case is the benchmark for e¢ ciency in output. The closeness of the
two trends also signies why the tests checking the non-neutrality of money have weak
predictive powers. It is due to the reason that as ination goes high rms adjust prices
more frequently resulting in contractionary impact on the magnitudes of mark-up distortion
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and price variation distortion. This is what near rationality implies and it allows the real
output to remain very close to its long run optimal level. In other words, in response to
any expansion in long run ination the steady state equilibrium shows least variations in
real output when price adjustment speed is endogenous, i.e., it is allowed to vary every
period.
Here even targeting ination less than  < 1:01 is much more feasible than it was in
the benchmark case. The reason is that below  = 1:01 output or any other variable is
not exogenous which results in free adjustments in all of them for the sake of equilibrium.
Since the price adjustment speed is low in the low ination regime then there would be
more producers charging mark-ups lower than the static mark-up at zero ination level
and the gain can be extended by producing more e¢ ciently so that it becomes more from
the loss incurred by price variation distortion.
Also from the gures 2.2 (a, b, c, d, & e) it is clear that the magnitude of di¤erence
of real output is extremely low from the optimal output in exogenous setting whereas the
relative price q0 is even lesser than it was at  = 1:01: Thus targeting a level as low as
 = 1:002 or 0.2% ination per quarter is optimal in this case which was not possible in
the benchmark case. This is attributed to near rationality where very low ination level is
under valued by the rms.
2.6 Illustration: Case for a Small Developing Country (Pakistan)
After reviewing the benchmark optimal output Calvo model and the Calvo model with xed
adjustment cost for a large developed country, i.e., USA it would be interesting to see how a
small developing country behaves under these models and do the outcomes have empirical
sense in them. Theoretical modeling is relatively di¢ cult for developing countries since
data for calibration of models is usually not available and even if it available it has a large
number of issues to be dealt with before it can be used. Same is the issue with Pakistan13
13Some of the distinctive features of Pakistans economy include high long run ination rate, supply side
shocks and a large inelastic labor force.
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where Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) collects a lot of economic and social data but
only put forward the results in shape of distributions generally. To estimate parameters or
to nd values for variables there is the need to go through raw data. The raw data is not
user friendly as it uses relatively old computer formats for storage out of which some are
obsolete for the modern softwares for data analysis. Secondly understanding the codes of
variables in the raw data sets require coding details which were not available for periods
earlier than 1990s. However the data from 1990 to 2007 has been organized and used for
this analysis. The data involves use of wage information and working hours in Pakistan,
and this data, to my knowledge, is yet to be utilized in Pakistan for any theoretical exercise.
The following table provides the parameters and their values at the steady state estimated
in the same way as in the case for USA in chapter 1. Price adjustment cost, A, is estimated
using the model extension with menu cost presented above in this chapter.
Table2.1: Calibrated Values of Model Parameters
Parameter Value
 0.998 (translates into quarterly return of 0.2%)
 0.8 (which results in a static mark-up 1= of 1.25)
 0.9 (degree of substitution between leisure and labor)
 1 (consumption and wages grow at the same rate)
a 1 (average productivity is assumed to be uniform)
g 1.0125 (in the long run it is 1.25% growth per quarter)
l 0.73 (standardized leisure time)
h 0.27 (standardized work time)
 1.02 (long run ination of 2% per quarter)
 0.33 (average price length of 3 quarters)
A 0.0270 (xed price adjustment cost, 6% of total cost)
The above parameter values have been used to solve the two models, i.e., the simple
Calvo model with exogenous y and the Calvo model with A.
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Fig.2.3a: Real wage rate and ination under Calvo pricing
(Pakistan-comparison)






















Fig.2.3b: Real output and long run  under Calvo pricing
(Pakistan-comparison)
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Fig.2.3c: Relative price q0 and long run  under Calvo
pricing (Pakistan-comparison)






















Fig.2.3d: Labor demand and long run  under Calvo pricing
(Pakistan-comparison)
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Fig. 2.3e: Price adjustment speed  and long run ination
under Calvo pricing (Pakistan-comparison)
Since the standard Calvo model with exogenous output serves as the benchmark for the
evaluation of the later model with xed adjustment cost the outcomes from the later would
be of more interest here. Also the standard model exhibit similar results in terms of trends
as for USA. There is only one major di¤erence, i.e., in g. 2.3e the monotonic relationship
between steady state long run ination and price adjustment probability where the later
becomes more sticky by the end and it does not come close to 1 even at  = 1:12; but
remains at around 0.87 whereas for USA prices have become fully exible by then. This can
be due to the high cost of price adjustment which is 6% in the case of Pakistan. Also when
there would be more monopoly power in the market the menu cost or the cost of generating
information for price change becomes much more costly hence making it desirable to not to
adjust prices. And it is only the monopolist producer who can deal with such a situation
over a long period of time.
The above nding can also be reinforced by looking at the behavior of the relative price
of the price adjusting rm in g. 2.3c. The backward bending behavior of the curve shows
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that at all points except at the beginning very low level of ination and at the end very
high level of ination zero vintage relative price is relatively higher than the benchmark
case. Since more monopoly power under endogenous price setting would mean adjusting
prices in such a manner that mark-ups remain at the highest possible level increasing both
the mark-up distortion and price variation distortion causing relatively more e¢ ciency loss
at di¤erent levels of steady state ination as compared to both the benchmark case and in
the case of USA.
Interestingly, for USA it was benecial to have a slightly higher long run ination target
as it is in accordance with the near rationality hypothesis as well as it helped in reducing
output ine¢ ciencies as compared to the benchmark case. However, for the case of Pakistan
targeting ination as close to zero ination as possible is the best strategy. Ination as
high as 1.002 or 0.2% per quarter can keep real output higher than at the long run average
ination rate at  = 1:02 and ination even above that up till  = 1:10: Also the demand
for labor at  = 1:002 is higher and their wages are lower than than benchmark case thus
accommodating the large labor force. Similarly zero-vintage relative price is just 1.02 which
is lower than all values it can have up till ination is 1.10.
So, in the case of Pakistan, where evidence of monopolistic power, large labor supply,
and supply side frictions have existed, targeting the lowest possible ination level is the most
desirable long run policy because at higher levels of long run ination it is the monopolists
only who benet. There is a good amount of literature dealing with urge of monopolists
having high ination rates as this help in their expansion in the times of low economic
activity and consolidation at times of high economic activity (See Nitzan and Bichler,
2000).
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we show that when an adjustment cost, which is very small as compared to
the cost of production, the models outcome is very near to the benchmark case. The model
satises the natural rate hypothesis in the spirit of near rationality in the long run. It thus
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is in line with the short run theoretical classication provided by Deveraux and Yetman
(2002). The deviations from the benchmark case are due to the marginal imbalances
between the price erosion e¤ect, which results in keeping optimal price relatively higher,
and the price adjustment speed e¤ect which works in the opposite direction, but still
rationality prevails.
The model also makes it possible to target a positive level of long run ination e¢ ciently
but not as high as it is in the benchmark case. This result provides with the insight that
at closer to zero levels of ination the adjustment cost models can deal with ine¢ ciencies
more e¤ectively as compared to the benchmark case.
In the end the illustration of Pakistan provides an insight that the model provides
reasonable outcome in the case of a small country facing high long run ination, supply
side shocks due to high monopolistic element and a large inelastic labor supply. It has
been observed that in such a situation targeting ination level as close to zero as possible
would be the best outcome because not only that would be the e¢ cient output level for
the country but also monopolists would not be able to make prot gains which they are





In the previous chapters we have shown various long run aspects of the neo-Keynesian
models with Calvo (1983) type pricing scheme. We have shown that these models have
di¤erent steady state values for real variables under di¤erent long run ination levels when
the price adjustment speed is held xed. Such an issue is settled in the sense of near
rationality when price adjustment cost is included into the model and price adjustment
speed is allowed to adjust monotonically with ination. This chapter deals with the same
issues but now the pricing contracts have been replaced with Taylor type of pricing contracts
coming out originally in Taylor (1980) dealing with wage staggering.
The idea behind Taylor pricing is that in each period of time only a xed fraction of
rms change their prices and their next turn to adjust prices come after all rms have
adjusted their prices. The simplest case, for the sake of an example is that of two rms in
an economy, with each rm changing its price in alternative periods and the cycle continues.
This results in a denite nite time path of price adjustment with every rm knowing about
its turn and time to adjust its price. Apart from nite time horizon the other di¤erence
Taylor pricing has with Calvo pricing is that it is originally discrete14 in nature due to the
indivisibility of rms. The relevance of using the discrete distribution for pricing contracts
makes sense as in the real world rms decide on the contract length with respect to real
indivisible discrete periods of time. Thus the distribution formed, under endogeneity, is
14 It can be converted to form a continuous distribution but there is loss of information in doing so.
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the discrete uniform distribution with equal weights on rms of all price vintages.
The purpose of this chapter is to see not only the similarities but also how the models
with Taylor pricing contracts di¤er from the models with Calvo pricing contracts from the
rst two chapters because there are two di¤erences in the set-up. The rst is that Taylor
contracts are discrete in nature and the second is that they have a nite time horizon
with all the rms knowing denitely when they can adjust their prices. The standard
way that has been used to compare Taylor and Calvo contracts is to see how much time
period does the Calvo price adjustment speed covers. In our case  = 0:25 shows that
the average time between two price changes is four quarters. This results in equating the
Taylor contract length T = 4 which is standard in literature but it is not the average time
between two price changes under the Taylor pricing setup. It is, infact, the average age
of Taylor contracts which does not equate to  = 0:25: However, there is a logical way to
make the two comparable, i.e., by equating the average time between two price adjustments
from Calvo pricing to the average age or average life time of Taylor contracts. The result is
di¤erent from equating T = 4 and is discussed in the fourth section of this chapter below.
3.1.1 Outline
The second and third sections cover the literature and the contributions of this chapter
respectively. The fourth section expresses the model in terms of the contract length T with
nite horizon and talks about comparing the Taylor contract length with the Calvo price
adjustment speed. Section ve is about the model with exogenously xed contract length
T . Section six constructs the benchmark case where the contract length is endogeneized by
assuming a stable level of output throughout. Section seven estimates the price adjustment




The basic motivation of this chapter comes from two papers. The rst one is by Ki-
ley (2002). By comparing the standard models under dynamic equilibrium he nds that
Calvo-type partial adjustment and Taylor-type staggering do not deliver similar output and
ination dynamics under both real and monetary shocks. He concludes that the perception
in the literature that two models are nearly identical is incorrect, and as using Calvo pricing
in place of Taylor pricing due to analytical convenience may result in reaching incorrect
quantitative conclusions. Overall, he nds relatively quicker convergence under Taylor con-
tracts as compared to the Calvo contracts. However, in order to compare the contracts
Kiley (2002) uses the standard criterion, i.e., to x the Taylor pricing contract length T
equal to the average of Calvo price adjustment probability  giving fT; g = f4; 0:25g.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), Ellison and Scott (1998), Dotsey, King, and Wol-
man (1997), Erceg (1997), Jeanne (1998), Gust (1998) have also found similar results by
using di¤erent model parameterizations but the same criterion to compare the two pricing
schemes.
Dixon and Kara (2006) agree to the extent with Kiley (2002) that quantitatively Calvo
and Taylor pricing contracts may yield di¤erent outcomes but they are not convinced on
the qualitative part. They believe that the comparison of both the contracts has to be
at a common ground. By carrying out the comparison in a standard way, researchers
are comparing the average age of Calvo contracts with the completed length of Taylor
contracts. When Dixon and Kara (2006) compare the average age of Taylor contracts
with the average of Calvo, the di¤erences become much smaller and easier to understand.
The comparison criterion is given in the fourth section and the later sections show that
by using Dixon and Karas (2006) comparison criterion Taylor pricing under all models is




The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
We use Dixon and Karas (2006) criteria regarding comparison of Calvo and Taylor
pricing contracts. In the standard setting when the Taylor contact length is exogenously
xed we show that the outcome is similar to the standard Calvo pricing case. The results
from both the models are qualitatively similar. This is found to be true for the benchmark
case as well where we show that under the discrete distribution setting for the contract
length T the resulting outcomes are qualitatively similar to the outcomes from the Calvo
pricing benchmark case of the rst chapter.
The second contribution is that we estimate the price adjustment cost from the model
and include it into the model and nd that when the horizon is nite the mark-up distortion
and price variation distortion are no more an issue for the rms and they keep their mark-
ups stable and focus on higher prots which results in higher output levels at higher
long run ination levels. However, this higher output level readjusts to a lower level
when such an ination target is chosen that endogenously a lower discrete and divisible
contract length T is realized. This sudden change in contract length leads many rms
to face the price adjustment cost and hence aggregate output gets lower. This is the
reason we nd lot of monotonic inertia regarding contract length T in response to long run
ination. These ndings are supportive of the near rationality hypothesis. These results are
qualitatively similar to the Calvo pricing with price adjustment cost however the situation
of the distortions, though weak, is such that there is no output expansionary e¤ect as well
as monotonic inertia under Calvo pricing. So the correct comparison criteria can provide
good qualitative comparison as well as does show what the quantitative di¤erences amongst
the two pricing schemes are.
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3.4 Model under Taylor Pricing
In this section it makes sense to start from producers directly as households are not involved
in any way with the price adjustment process so they still maximize their utility according
to the same utility function and constraints as in chapter one. The Taylor pricing model is
based on a discrete uniform distribution [0; T ] where all rms know about the time horizon
of their next price change, i.e., the time horizon is deterministic in nature and this contrast
with Calvo pricing can lead to di¤erent outcomes under steady state equilibrium. Since
rms are indivisible and to be as near as possible to the original literature we have taken
T to be discrete in this chapter. As compared to Calvo pricing there are no di¤erences
in the outcomes of relationships qualitatively when T is exogenous. However, when T is
endogeneized then the trade-o¤ curves would be in a zigzag pattern, and within the xed
regions the Taylor model with endogenous contract length would resemble the trade-o¤
outcomes from Calvo model with adjustment cost. It is to be noted that making the
discrete distribution a continuous one is quite simple in this case however, there is a loss of
information attributed to it which can be useful in understanding the true long run nature
of the Taylor pricing contracts.
3.4.1 Producers
Pricing
Even though the pricing setup is di¤erent, the producers face the similar CES demand
function as in the previous chapters. They produce at the level of the non-horizontal





ct: Since in this model
rms have monopoly power they can have a constant mark-up 1= over their real marginal
cost. There are T rms in the economy and each period a xed fraction of rms are allowed
to adjust prices. The xed fraction is 1=T which than takes 0; 1; 2; ::::; T   1 time intervals
to let all the rms reset their prices. Thus, the aggregation of prices consists of T  1 nite











































and to obtain a relationship between ination t = Pt=Pt 1 and relative price q0 in the










Expression (3:2) relates q0 and  negatively, and q0 and T positively. As ination rises
real time price falls and if T is higher it means that lesser rms are allowed to change prices
every period of time (resulting in a longer cycle of price adjustments by all rms), hence
causing the relative price (in aggregation) to be relatively higher than at lower values of T:
Since real output is equal to aggregate consumption (yt = ct), the production function
is yk;t = atHk;t, and each rm earns a nominal prot k;t = (Pk;tck;t   Pt	k;t). Dividing it
by the aggregate price level gives the real prot which is a positive function of rms relative
price and its output demanded/ consumed, and a negative function of real marginal cost.
It is expressed as:
k;t =  (qk;t; wt; at; ct) = (qk;t    (wt; at)) ck;t (3.3)
The rms pricing problem is to choose q0;t so as to maximize the discounted prot for the
following T   1 periods of xed price. We recursively dene 
t = (wt; at; ct) [ 
t+1: The
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where Qt+1 = 1=tj=1t+j and when there is no growth and zero ination the equilibrium
constant mark-up is 1=: It is important to note here that (3:4) is similar to the optimal
pricing under Calvo except that now the horizon is nite, i.e., T   1; and T is discrete.
Output
Each producer produces along the demand curve he faces and charges the price qk;t, hence
his output can be stated as yk;t = (qk;t)
 1=(1 ) ct. Since the denition of the aggregate
price index ensures that aggregate real output be equal to aggregate real consumption,
aggregate real output is a positive function of overall consumption and a negative function


















From the production function of a rm, its labor demand can be estimated to be Hk;t =
yk;t=at and following the aggregation formulation aggregate labor of demand can be ex-











(1 ) yt=at. According to the evolution of price qk;t = q0;t=kj=1t+j =
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The labor demand here is the negative function of the relative price of the zero-vintage
rm q0, ination and T: And the positive function of overall output yt:
3.4.2 Steady State
Under steady state the time subscript is suppressed and nite horizon aggregation prop-
erties are exploited to get the expressions for aggregates of labor demand (3:6), labor
supply, and optimal pricing (3:4). Labor supply is given by the households time con-
straint ht = 1   lt; which from the households rst order conditions for lt and ct can be
expressed as 1   w 1=t c=t where ct = yt while we assume  = 1: So in the steady state
labor supply can be expressed as ht = 1   (c=w)1= which in real terms can be expressed



















In the steady state, for optimal pricing (3:4) ; the ratio for marginal productivity of
labor is substituted with growth rate g and after solving for the summation with nite























Denition Given constant ination  and constant growth rate a t+1=at = g, the steady
state equilibrium along the balanced growth path is a solution of fct; lt; ht; bt+1;mt=pt; q0;Ht; Pt; Rt; wtg
and the two shadow prices t; t; from the Lagrangian that satisfy:
(i) households rst order conditions;
(ii) households budget constraint

wtht +Dt + bt +
mt 1
Pt






the time endowment constraint (1 = ht + lt);
(iii) production decisions according to the optimal pricing (3.9); and
(iv) market clearing conditions that equate labor demand to labor supply, and clear the
money and bond markets.
3.4.3 Calibration of T
With the calibrated results already available, from the rst chapter for the US economy
(quarterly from 1960 to 2005), here only the price adjustment speed has to be decided
upon. As there are T nite periods of stickiness so every period 1=T rms are allowed to
change their prices. This means that under Taylor pricing 1=T actually represents  from
Calvo pricing. This has remained a standard belief in the literature. However, Dixon and
Kara (2006)15 specify a couple of ways to relate Calvo and Taylor pricing contracts which
are discussed below as these methods then help pinning down the relevant T which equates
to  = 0:25 from Calvo pricing.
Relating Taylor Contracts to corresponding Calvo Contracts
In Dixon and Kara (2006) they comment on the earlier paper by Kiley (2002) and criticize
the comparison carried out between Calvo and Taylor contracts when the average length of
Calvo contracts is compared with the complete length of Taylor contracts which make both
15They nd that equating 1=T equal to  is actually equating the total life of Taylor pricing contracts
with the average age of Calvo pricing contracts, and this is they reason that the studies mentioned in the
literature review nd models with Taylor pricing both quantitatively and qualitatively di¤erent from the
models with Calvo pricing.
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the contracts qualitatively and quantitatively di¤erent from each other. Dixon and Kara
(2006), instead, prove that if comparison between Calvo and Taylor contracts is carried
out on the basis of similar criteria then both the contracts are qualitatively similar to
each other. The di¤erence then remains only due to the fact that the autocorrelation in
output is relatively higher under Taylor contracts as compare to Calvo contracts. Thus,
quantitatively both the pricing schemes can be di¤erent from each other. Two criteria
mentioned to relate Taylor and Calvo pricing contracts are:.
(i) average age of contracts (age since birth);
(ii) average lifetime of contracts (the contract lifetime).
Since Taylor contracts are determined by their contract length T and Calvo contracts
by their price adjustment probability , if the above criteria are used they can both become
comparable. Let us explain the above then:
(i) Average Age of Contracts A
The T period Taylor contracts with T equal sized cohorts have cross-sectional average




In Calvo pricing the average age is just the reciprocal of the price adjustment proba-





, T = 2  

Since  = 0:25 from empirical and calibration results in chapter 1, by substituting it
in the above expression Taylor pricings T = 7:
(ii) Average Lifetime of Contracts N
The average contract lifetime is just the contract length T under Taylor contracts.
There is, however, no evidence that the complete distribution of all contracts lengths under
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Calvo pricing has ever been derived, but the age distribution is given by:
t = (1  )t 1; t = 1; 2; ::::;1
Since the average age of contracts is AC = 1=; it follows that expected average lifetime
of the population of contracts would be 2=. And with a constant rate of  the steady
state distribution of completed contract lengths can be expressed as:
N = 
2N(1  )N 1;N = 1; 2; ::::;1
which has the mean NC = 2   1; which is almost double of that of the average age of
contracts and is quite intuitive since in the steady state the average age of the contracts is
the age at half point of that of the complete lifetime of the contracts. Similar relationship
exists for Taylor contracts where the mean of lifetime contracts is NT = 2AT   1 = T; and















With  = 0:25; we have T = 7:
3.5 Standard Taylor Model with Exogenous T
Under exogenous Calvo pricing contracts there exists a long run trade-o¤ between ination
and real variables. Now let us see from the gures below if such a trade-o¤ exists under
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exogenous T as well or not with T xed at T = 7:
















Fig. 3.1a: Real wage rate and ination under Taylor pricing
with exogenous T


























Fig. 3.1b: Real output and ination under Taylor pricing
with exogenous T
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Fig. 3.1c: Relative price q0 and ination under Taylor pricing
with exogenous T


















Fig. 3.1d: Labor demand and ination under Taylor pricing
with exogenous T
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The gures 3.1 (a, b, c, and d) provide the long run relationships between ination and
other variables, i.e., real wage, real output, relative price, and labor demand. From the
calibrations we know that the long run steady state equilibrium for USA is at  = 1:01
where w=a = 0:799: Figure 3.1a shows that at all points of long run ination above  = 1:01
real wage rate falls hence showing the existence of the long run trade-o¤ between ination
and real wage rate. Figure 3.1b shows the same for real output.
Since the contract length T is exogenous, a higher ination results in higher price
variations resulting in higher price distortion. This results in all rms hiring di¤erent labor
inputs and producing at di¤erent levels according to their demand curves which results
in ine¢ ciency in production. This ine¢ ciency here due to price variation distortion is
the level of lower output with the same aggregate labor demanded at all ination levels
but this is not evident from gure 3.1d where demand for labor is also falling along with
falling output in gure 3.1b. This is due to the existence of the second distortion, i.e.,
mark-up distortion. From zero-vintage relative price q0 movement in gure 3.1c it is clear
that as long-run ination goes up, marginal mark-up goes up as well as price adjusting
rms try to be as ahead of the aggregate average price as possible in order to mitigate
the future price erosion e¤ects till the time their next turn comes to adjust prices. Since
the mark-up has also gone up, it leads producers with relatively newer prices to produce
less, thereby reducing aggregate labor demand under higher long run ination. If the
exogenously specied T is high or the corresponding  is low, then, as the long run ination
level goes higher, the mark-up distortion becomes larger in magnitude. And as the mark-up
distortion dominates in this case real wages come down.
Figure 3.1d shows that labor demand is getting lesser with consequently higher long
run ination. It is because rms are not producing at a single level economy wide as the
rms with newer prices produce less than the ones with older prices. This result in lower
aggregate labor demand and the wealth e¤ect on the household results in bringing the real
wages down as well. The level of zero-vintage relative price q0, as well, shows both the
degree of price variation distortion and mark-up distortion. When it moves positively with
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long run ination, as in the case of the standard Calvo model, it enhances the magnitude
of both the distortions.
Graham and Snower (2004) have shown by using Taylor wage contracts that long run
ination is output contracting except only in mild ination regime. But with exogenous
T both price variation distortion and mark-up distortion start rising as long run ination
level rises above zero ination, in such price setting behaviour only zero long run ination
would provide the best outcome as all rms demand equal labor and produce at the same
level as well there are no price variation and mark-up distortions, hence no ine¢ ciencies.
This is also the only way natural rate hypothesis can be met in this case.
3.6 Taylor Model with Endogenous T (Benchmark case with Exogenous
Real Output)
As in the last section we observe that due to xed price contract length T we had the
long run trade-o¤ between real output and ination which was qualitatively similar to the
Calvo pricing models outcome with exogenous price adjustment speed. The next stage
is to construct the benchmark case. Since real output has been exogeneized to make the
price adjustment speed endogenous in the Calvo pricing benchmark case, we do the same
here. However, with discrete distribution of T it is not as straightforward as it was under
Calvo pricing because T is limited to have discrete values and these values only occur at a
point where the steady state equilibrium occurs.
Suppose T = f1   1; :::::7; 6; 5; 4; 3; 2; 1g (where 1  1 indicates a whole number less
than innity) that can be up to some nite whole number because the number of time
periods is discrete. Bringing in use the comparison of average age or average lifetime cal-
culations for Taylor and Calvo pricing schemes by Dixon and Kara (2006) we can nd the
corresponding values of Calvo price adjustment probabilities for the above set of T values,
i.e.,  = f0; :::::0:25; 0:29; 0:4; 0:5; 0:67; 1g. Since we are interested in the monetary neutral-
ity at all points we only use discrete points for T where steady state equilibrium can exist
and the gures below show the points joined by lines to see if long run neutrality has been
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met or not. If all points for discrete T in relation to long run ination are considered then
there would be a zigzag pattern in between two discrete points of steady state equilibrium
disturbing monetary neutrality16. There would exist a long run relationship similar to the
standard case above in between two points of the steady state equilibrium and this is the
case in the next model too where there is the price adjustment cost involved17.
In order to satisfy the natural rate hypothesis, and as we did under Calvo pricing,
we assume real output y=a to be exogenous at its empirical long run steady state level,
i.e., y=a = 0:5172: Some literature has been discussed in the rst chapter that looks at
exogeneity in terms of real wages, but the results are inconclusive that either exogeneity in
real wages is better than exogeneity in real output. Since we do not intend to discuss about
disination, i.e.,  < 1; for equilibrium to hold at this condition we need j ( 1(1 ) g)T j< 1;
j (

(1 ) g)T j< 1; and j  1  T 1=(1 ) j< 1: With  > 1;  < 1 and  < 1 the above
conditions are easily met and we talk about positive ination only. Under this setting there
would exist a monotonic relationship between long run ination and contract length T: It
is important to note that with fT; g = f7; 0:25g, Taylor and Calvo contracts have the
same average contract age and the same average lifetime of contracts.
3.6.1 Long Run Relationships under the Benchmark Case
If a continuous uniform distribution is assumed for the contract length then there would not
be any zigzag patterns in the long run relationships of real variables with ination. This is
because now the contract length T can take any value between any two discrete values for
T; which cannot be the case under the discrete distribution setting. In the benchmark case
the continuous uniform distribution, if used in place of discrete distribution, would yield
16 In the benchmark case the highest possible contract length where steady state equilibrium takes place
is T = 75 and the second highest possible contract length is T = 24: It is because we are using the average
age of the contract length as the value for T and in discrete form that has to be divisible as well according
to Dixon and Karas (2005) criteria.
17However, if a continuous uniform distribution is assumed then there would not be any zigzag patterns
in the long run relationships of real variables with ination. This is because now the contract length T
can take any value between any two discrete values for T which it cannot under the discrete distribution
setting. The results would be very similar in this case as compared to the models under Calvo price setting.
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similar gures, i.e., gures (3.2a, 3.2b, 3.2c, 3,2d). But g. 3.2e would be a continuous
monotonic function rather then in steps. Even in this case if the beginning points of all
the steps are joined together the resulting curve would represent the continuous setting.
The steps in g. 3.2e are just for easy comparison with the outcome from the model with
the price adjustment cost. In this respect, the outcome of this model is qualitatively and
even quantitatively similar to the Calvo pricing benchmark model.
In the benchmark case with exogenous output the e¢ ciency is optimal at long run
ination levels higher than  = 1:005; i.e., where in g. 3.2a the real wage rate becomes
stable for higher ination levels. Almost similar is the case with labor demand in g. 3.2d
which remains almost stable at higher ination levels. However, at very low ination levels,
i.e., below  = 1:005 there is a large ine¢ ciency in production, which is similar to the Calvo
case and which is due to the imposition of exogeneity condition on output.


















Fig. 3.2a: Real wage rate and ination under Taylor pricing
with endogenous T
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Fig. 3.2b: Real output and ination under Taylor pricing
with endogenous T













Fig. 3.2c: Relative price q0 and ination under Taylor pricing
with endogenous T
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Fig. 3.2d: Labor demand and ination under Taylor pricing
with endogenous T
Since the contract length is endogenous now, a rise in long run ination level above
zero results in a decline in the average mark-up till when the ination  = 1:005: This is
evident from gure 3.2c where the zero-vintage relative price falls quickly in response to
rising long run ination level (i.e., for   1:005) but after that it becomes stable. Hence
prices tend to be very sticky under very low levels of ination and consequently there exists
ine¢ ciency in production due to the highly persistent mark-up distortion. The reason is
that at such low levels of ination, adjusting rms select very high mark-ups, however the
average mark-up may go down given the large number of non-adjusting rms. This then
results in reduced demand for labor and consequently real wage rate at very low ination
levels which is shown in gures 3.2d. and 3.2a (due to he wealth e¤ect) respectively. Firms
produce di¤erent levels of output with the few adjusting ones producing less and charging
very high mark-ups. The price distortion is quite weak here because overall only a few
rms adjust every period and the aggregate contract length is dominated by the older
price contracts. Overall the xed output production is met but in an ine¢ cient way. Here
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Akerlof, Dickens and Perrys (2000) preposition of near rationality holds, i.e., at ination
levels very close to zero, in this case   1:005; results in quite sticky prices because for
as small as up to 0.5 % of ination most of the producers are indi¤erent to whether they
adjust prices or not. Figure 2e also shows the same. However, at higher ination levels the
natural rate hypothesis holds in its true sense.































Fig. 3.2e: Endogenous T and ination under Taylor pricing
The endogenous contract length T provides the incentive to the price adjusting produc-
ers to keep reducing mark-ups in response to rising long run ination target. As ination
rises so does the price variation distortion and to reduce it, the optimal action would be
to reset the contract length so that the price variations between the price adjusting and
non-adjusting producers can be close to each other. This, on the other hand, restores equal
production through equal inputs by all rms as well as the mark-up becomes constant al-
most at the level of static mark-up. This can be seen from gure 3.2c where the relative
price q0t becomes almost constant when ination   1:005:
In this case targeting zero ination is not justied as output can be produced more
e¢ ciently than it can be produced at zero ination level. However, maintaining long-
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run ination in moderate limit, i.e., above  = 1:005 and around  = 1:01 is the best
option available as at this level exogenous output level has been met for the rst time
using the labor input at the least possible marginal/average cost and the same trend then
continues at higher levels of ination. At these higher levels of ination both mark-up and
price variation distortion may exist but they both have so little magnitudes that their real
e¤ects on labor, wages, and relative price are of no signicance. In gure 3.2e we see that
reaching an average contract length of T = 2; i.e.,  = 0:67 is as quick as in the benchmark
case under Calvo pricing, however, under nite and known horizon setup there is lot of
inertia later. It is notable that for T to become T = 1; i.e.,  = 1 the long run ination
has to be as high as  = 1:60; i.e., 60% ination every quarter for the long term.
3.7 Taylor Pricing Model with Price Adjustment Cost
In the benchmark model case we have already observed similar dynamics in both the Calvo
pricing model and the Taylor pricing model. Now it is to observe how the Taylor pricing
model behaves under a setup that includes a price adjustment cost A. The nite horizon in
this case is di¤erent from the Calvo pricing model setup and can have di¤erent implications
for the outcome. Since the model has already been laid out in the previous section and
nothing changes for the household. For the producers, they now have a value function that
needs to be maximized at a contract length T:
3.7.1 Value Function
The value function recursively denes the nite horizon of the producer who changes his
price and pays a xed price adjustment cost A in one period and than continues for the






T (V0  A) (3.10)
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The rst term of (3:10) represents the discounted stream of prot  when price is
adjusted, whereas the second term provides the discounted value of the price adjusting





 t =(1 )    (q0 t) 1=(1 ) y (3.11)
and since T is discrete, instead of di¤erentiation like under Calvo pricing with xed
adjustment cost, we can just substitute (3:11) 18 into the value function (3:10) to get the
value for xed adjustment cost A: Using the properties for summation we can express the






























1  T A (3.12)
Estimation of A
While dealing with the presence of the price adjustment cost under Calvo pricing,
estimating A was straightforward, i.e., just solving the explicit expression of the value
function. However, in this case it is tricky. Since T is discrete, we need to be sure that
at steady state equilibrium contract length T = 7; corresponding to ination  = 1:01;
we have such a value of A such that at no other contract length T the value function is
maximized. In other words, the value is the largest for the value function at this point. To
do so, we calculate the value for A corresponding to  = 1:01 from the solution of (3:12) at
T = f6; 7; 8g. As V0 should be maximum at T = 7, we get a range for A in between which
V0 is maximum at T = 7: Averaging this range gives the value for A that maximizes the
value function at T = 7. The adjustment cost A = 0:0083: This value is almost half of the
18where  = w=a:
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value of A under Calvo pricing.
3.7.2 Relationships and Trade-o¤s
The important aspect here di¤erent from the Calvo model with price adjustment cost if
the nite horizon which adds certainty to the model as rms know when would they be
able to change their prices in future. Also we see a zigzag pattern when it comes to real
wage rate and real output in gures 3.3a and 3.3b respectively. This pattern is due to the
discrete uniform distribution where endogenous value of T exists only at whole number
points satisfying the average age of contract length criteria for both fT; g. Making it
continuous is achievable, i.e., by joining the starting values of all the zigzags. If such an
exercise is done it is observable from the gures 3.3a and 3.3b that the resulting curve
would lie relatively much closer to the benchmark curve hence satisfying the natural rate
hypothesis in the near rationality sense.





















Fig. 3.3a: Real wage rate and long run  (Taylor pricing
comparison)
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Fig. 3.3b: Real output and long run  (Taylor pricing
comparison)

















Fig. 3.3c: Relative price qo and long run  (Taylor pricing
comparison)
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Fig. 3.3d: Labor demand and long run  (Taylor pricing
comparison)
Having continuity would lead the model to undermine the extent of the impact of a
denite horizon for price adjustment. However, under this setting real rationality holds at
all points of the steady state equilibrium, which now include the points where the contract
length T remains xed due to its discreteness and indivisibility, as well as helps in explaining
the output expansionary trend in the gure 3.3b.
The gures above (3.3a, 3.3b) show that as the long run ination level rises there is an
expansionary e¤ect in the real output and real wage. This e¤ect is rising with ination in
general but when such a value for endogenous contract length T is possible at a certain
level of ination the output falls creating the zigzag pattern. By the time ination is 30%,
i.e.,  = 1:3 per quarter in the long run the benchmark output level and real wage level
are reached by the model with adjustment cost. The labor demand in g. 3.3d falls quite
fast in the beginning but then always remains above the benchmark case and shows the
similar zigzag pattern as in the graphs above.
The most interesting outcome is regarding the zero vintage relative price q0: Fig. 3.3c
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shows that it remains stable at all long run ination levels. This is di¤erent from the Calvo
model where in the beginning the relative price was getting higher and later started to
come down and formed the backward bending curve. In g. 3.3b we observe that as the
long run ination level is moved to a higher level the rms know that they cannot change
their contract length until a lower value for T becomes possible. So till that period the
same value for T remains the average contract age of the pricing contracts. These ranges
between two levels of ination can be seen in g.3.3e. So, in this situation the rms are
safer regarding the actions of other rms in terms of the mark-up. They know that if
some rms set a higher mark-up very soon they can do the same. This keeps the mark-up
stable and its stability rises with ination and consequently the price adjustment speed.
This also minimizes the price variation distortion. This results in the rms facing no price-
adjustment speed e¤ect and price variation e¤ect because they keep their relative prices
stable under which the best policy is to e¢ ciently produce more output at higher prices
earning more prot. The more output produces than in the benchmark case also results in
relatively more labor demand and higher wages.
When a high enough ination level is targeted that the contract length T can be en-
dogenously adjusted monotonically, i.e., the average contract length shortens or T becomes
smaller, then the real output falls back in g. 3.3b. The reason for this falling back of
output is the shortening of the horizon of T which then results in more rms facing the
price adjustment cost A in each period of time. Some of these rms might have adjusted
prices in the very last period and might have to wait for a few more periods to adjust
prices before moving to a smaller T . So reduction in the length of time horizon results
in a sudden unexpected payment of adjustment cost A. This initial impact results in a
sudden initial drop in output, wages and labor demand, however, the relative price remains
constant. This sudden reduction in output can be compared to the nature of relationship
under Calvo pricing with adjustment cost, i.e., as ination level goes up the corresponding
output level starts to remain minutely lower than the benchmark case. When the average
pricing contract age reduces from T = 3 to T = 2, i.e., at  = 1:3 the real output fall to
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its benchmark level in gure 3.3b. Such inertia can be seen in gure 3.3e which shows the
monotonic relationship between long-run ination and average contract length T in terms
of the price adjustment speed  values.


























Fig. 3.3e: Endogenous contract length T and long run
ination (Taylor pricing comparison)
The inertia is increasing monotonically with ination in g. 3.3e. The price adjustment
cost in the Calvo model both in the benchmark case and the model with adjustment cost
did not di¤er so signicantly. Here the benchmark case is similar, even quantitatively, to
the Calvo benchmark case. But the Taylor model with adjustment cost shows a lot of
inertia as compared to the Calvo model with adjustment cost. The g. 3.3e shows that
even to have T = 3, i.e.,  = 0:5 the ination has to be as high as  = 1:11; whereas in
the Calvo model with adjustment cost the adjustment speed rose to  = 0:95 by the same
ination level. For this to happen under the Taylor setting we need ination as high as
 = 2; i.e., ination of 100% per quarter.
The above relationships show that denitely qualitatively Taylor pricing models are
similar to Calvo pricing models (both with price adjustment cost). The Taylor pricing
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model with adjustment cost conrms with the near rationality hypothesis at all levels
however the existence of the natural rate hypothesis in this case is on the weaker side as
compared to the Calvo pricing model.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have compared the Calvo and Taylor pricing contracts in terms of
matching their average duration and average lifetime as advised by Dixon and Kara (2006).
As a result, we were able to show that we have qualitatively similar results for both the
price setting schemes under the standard and the benchmark cases. Similar results have
been shown for the model with price adjustment cost as well. We show that there is an
output expansion under Taylor pricing contracts with adjustment cost which is attributed
to the ine¢ ciency causing distortions being marginalized due to the existence of the denite
and nite horizon for price adjustment. We nd that using discrete distribution for Taylor
contracts T is close to reality as this is what rms face, i.e., they need to make decisions
regarding price adjustment with respect to discrete time periods which are indivisible
(e.g., a month, a quarter). We also nd that the near rationality argument holds at very
low ination levels under the benchmark case as well as all as throughout the case with
price adjustment cost. However, although qualitatively similar, the natural rate hypothesis
even with respect to near rationality is relatively weaker in the case of the Taylor pricing
contracts with adjustment cost due to the expansionary nature of output.
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Chapter 4
The Nature of Dual Heterogeneity-Shocks within
a Shock
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the focus has been on the idea that while there are long run
persistent output disturbances in response to ination, the magnitude of such disturbances
can become small if the price adjustment probability is allowed to change monotonically
with ination over time. This chapter deals with a more general issue that is heterogeneity
in the price adjustment frequency and where the relationship between the adjustment speed
and ination need not be monotonic. Price adjustment heterogeneity has two dimensions:
one across rms/sectors (cross-section) and the other across time (inter-temporal). Cross-
section heterogeneity has gained focus a la Carvalho (2006) who considers price adjustment
heterogeneity across sectors. This follows the empirical work of Bils and Klenow (2005)
who empirically document this heterogeneity in U.S data. Carvalho (2006) allows for cross
sectional heterogeneity but holds heterogeneity across time xed. This chapter, as a natural
extension to the earlier chapters also considers heterogeneity across sector.
In this chapter, a traditional DSGE model with Calvo pricing has been used to allow
for both inter-temporal heterogeneity and sectoral heterogeneity. This is an extension of
Carvalho (2006) in the sense that he uses heterogeneity only across sectors and not over
time. The issue of studying dual heterogeneity is based on allowing for general price setting
environments and not using simplied Calvo-type environments which though not based
on any realism, are easy to analyze. Allowing for the dual heterogeneity raises some issues
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regarding aggregation (to be made explicit below) and thus, on the resulting dynamics.
The dynamics in the general set-up can be very di¤erent from those in environments where
the price adjustment is monotonically changing. This can result in non-smooth dynamics
and this can a¤ect the policy conclusions drawn from Calvo-type models.
The approach is to study the impulse responses arising due to a one time monetary
shock. The impulse response is extended for a long period of time; let us say forty quarters
which is equivalent to ten years, so that the convergence of the output to its steady state
level can be studied. In the previous chapters it has been shown that when there is
monotonic time heterogeneity-that is when the rate of adjustment is increasing in the rate
of ination-then the real output converges to the steady state. Now with inter-temporal
heterogeneity, that is when the rate of change of the prices is not positively linked in a xed
way to the rate of ination, the question is how quick the convergence can be. Intuitively
convergence should be quicker as there is even greater exibility in price adjustment across
sectors as well as across time so that the rms can move as quickly as possible to adjust
prices and reach the steady state. This is in line with both the natural rate hypothesis and
near rationality hypothesis. This idea is to be contrasted with the recent literature that
supports persistence occurring due to heterogeneity across sectors in the price adjustment
process. The aggregate results are compared with those from monotonic time heterogeneous
outcomes in three cases where each case represents a di¤erent distribution used for drawing
price adjustment probabilities. This chapter tries to research if there is a denite answer to
convergence and its speed and whether more heterogeneity results in quicker convergence
or whether it supports persistence.
Another nding of this chapter is that with dual heterogeneity when the prices are
aggregated across sectors, there is a non-linearity which does not cancel out. Thus, there
is a non-trivial aggregation problem that has not been addressed in the literature. It is not
possible to show analytically the dynamics of ination and hence, also the price adjustment
in each sector. Thus, the dynamics are solved by numerical aggregation. This results in
non-smoothness of the impulse response functions. This does not arise when there is only
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one kind of heterogeneity (either only monotonically across time as in the earlier chapters
or only across sectors as in Carvalho (2006)). This leaves room for further research so
that the models can be made parsimonious with complete aggregation and yield close form
solutions.
This chapter is organized as follows: the literature is reviewed in the next section,
section three outlines the contributions, section four deals with the methodology used,
section ve further analyzes the results, and section six is the conclusion.
4.2 Literature Review
There is a challenge in collecting empirical information on prices quotations and their
changes over time. Handling this data is also not an easy task because of the coverage
of products. Additionally, one has to check for the consistency of the data points so
that the same good is tracked over time, and that the price quotations across goods or
sectors are from the same time period. Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980) type homogeneous
pricing rules simplify the issue considerably as the price adjustment is the same across
sectors as well as across time. A reason for the popularity of these pricing rules is due to
their tractability within models. They have also proven to perform reasonably mimicking
outcomes as compared to the much more technical state dependent modeling techniques
which may require a lot of ground work in terms of estimating deep parameters based on
micro-foundations.
However, over time data on price quotations has become available and data handling
techniques have improved hence making it possible to review the performance of homo-
geneous pricing rules by comparing their results with those from the actual data. Bils
and Klenow, (2005), based on their US pricing survey, conclude that prices change much
more frequently as well as the frequency of price changes di¤ers dramatically across goods.
Their main conclusion is that the homogeneous sticky price models over-predicts ination
persistence and under-predicts price volatility. Now with the existence of these empiri-
cally veried results there is reasonable scope to research on the e¤ects of underlying price
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dynamics within the theoretical models so that their performance and predictability can
be improved upon, and using heterogeneous pricing schemes both over time and sectors is
going to be one such improvement.
Carvalho (2006) in an important paper, based on the evidence of substantially di¤erent
frequency of price adjustments across sectors, shows that monetary shocks tend to have
relatively larger and more persistent real e¤ects in heterogeneous economies as compared
to identical rm economies with similar degrees of nominal and real rigidity. He points out
that cross-sectional heterogeneity in theoretical models is often ignored as it does not seem
to a¤ect aggregate dynamics in a signicant way. However, heterogeneity of the speed of
adjustment across sectors leads to di¤erent price adjustment speeds across sectors and this
has a non-trivial aggregate e¤ect on the cross-section behavior of rms. Over the early
part of the propagation path of the impulse response, sectors with relatively higher price
adjustment speed dominate while over time the adjustment speed slows down as the other
sectors with relatively lower adjustment probability progressively start dominating.
Dixon and Kara (2010) model distributions for frequencies of price adjustment to bring
into use the micro-evidence on pricing. They nd the technique promising in explaining
ination persistence but also realize that there is still a long way to go before the use of
such methods can provide with denite results.
Alvarez and Burriel (2010), in another recent paper on the same issue, make use of the
empirical evidence of heterogeneity in pricing behaviour at rm level (encompassing both
di¤erences in price adjustment speed across goods and across a cross-section of rms re-
gardless of the sectoral distinction) and try to mimic the true distribution of the frequency
of price adjustments through a probability density function estimated using the maximum
likelihood method. Using Spanish CPI and PPI data they show that this classication re-
sults in clear improvements in understanding price and ination dynamics whereas ignoring
it results in underestimation of the impact of nominal shocks on real variables. Their pa-
per however stays away from naming the distributions they use for their analysis. Another
important point is that such a classication is at odds with Carvalhos (2006) sectoral clas-
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sication where prices are homogeneous within sectors. This leads to an underestimation
of the share of both very sticky and very exible price setters. This can have consequences
for the selection of distribution for price adjustment frequencies.
Heterogeneity in price adjustment frequency can exist due to many reasons and Alvarez
and Burriel (2010) name a couple of them, i.e., cost structure and market competition.
Entry and exit of rms can also play a crucial role. If the number of rms entering the
market, which tend to have more sticky prices, is much larger than those rms which are
exiting the market, nominal shocks would have weaker real e¤ects and vice versa. Also,
if there is a specic pattern of entry and exit of rms uncertainty about the propagation
of shocks can be minimized. However, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) show that
no such empirical evidence exists which conrms a similar pattern of entry and exit across
rms over a long period of time.
Another recent paper by Male (2010) shows that in developed countries where produc-
tion is spanned over many production stages, each stage has its own marginal cost and
they all do not change simultaneously in response to a monetary shock. Marginal cost
of earlier stages change rapidly whereas that of the later stages is much slower in pace
to change hence a¤ecting the overall cost of production and price adjustment probability.
This results in persistent output uctuations with respect to its steady state.
4.3 Contributions
This chapter studies convergence of real variables to their steady state in response to a
nominal shock using dual heterogeneity. As mentioned above this chapter is the rst to
take seriously the dual heterogeneity in price adjustment. By using three distributions for
random drawing of price adjustment probabilities over the propagation path of the impulse
response, it is shown that convergence always occurs but its speed depends upon the distri-
bution. It is observed that when an unbiased distribution is used the speed of convergence
in case of dual heterogeneity is relatively quicker as compared to the convergence under
monotonic price heterogeneity. However, when one biased distribution, in favor of price
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stickiness, is used it resulted in slightly slower convergence as compared to the monotonic
price heterogeneity case. Thus, if the true distribution of the price adjustment frequencies
is known only then a general result can be provided. However, except Dixon and Kara
(2010), the literature is not explicit about the distributions being used. Thus, it is di¢ cult
to interpret the results on speed of adjustment.
This chapter while dealing with convergence also recognizes that due to dual heterogene-
ity in price adjustment frequency aggregation is no longer trivial and as a result the impulse
responses are not smooth. This remains an open research area. Due to the challenges in ag-
gregation, numerical simulations, as in DSGE models, seem to be the appropriate method.
4.4 Methodology
The focus of this chapter is to show that how heterogeneity a¤ects the impulse responses
of the macroeconomic model. Macroeconomic modeling has been focused on building Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models in the recent years. Their success is
based on their structure which allows for simultaneous solution of many economic agents
economic problems over time, and since expectations are part of such models they have
been able to replicate the real economic activity even when it is subject to random shocks.
However, these models are mathematically challenging and solving them requires various
considerations and trade-o¤s in terms of model size and its structure. No doubt that Al-
varez and Buriel (2010) stayed away from aggregation in their DSGE model while modeling
for price heterogeneity because under a linearized environment such heterogeneity in prices
disappears. It is the same reason that Carvalho (2006) focuses on sectoral heterogeneity
and considers no e¤ect of it in aggregate dynamics. To include both time and sectoral
heterogeneity in a DSGE model a simulation activity is devised in this chapter. To carry
out this simulation exercise the Smets and Wouters (2007) DSGE model has been used.
Most of these DSGE models as well as Smets and Wouters (2007) are modeled with
Calvo type homogenous price stickiness or with monotonic price adjustment schemes where
frequency of price adjustment changes in the same direction as ination. In this model,
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this monotonic relationship has been replaced with time as well as sectoral heterogeneity.
In this way it is an extension of Carvalho (2006). Smets and Wouters (2007) model is
the most important DSGE model in the sense that it has attracted most of the attention
as compared to other DSGE models and it is fairly technical encompassing quite a few
ideas and techniques with which many other DSGE models have struggled. Because of
its important place in the economic literature, this model has been used in the simulation
study. Important to note is that the earlier studies, mentioned above, tackling the same
issue as in this chapter use DSGE models as well and those models also tend to be very
close to Smets and Wouters (2007). In order to understand what pricing and ination
looks like in Smets and Wouters (2007) the following equations are explained below:
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which shows that deviations in marginal cost are attributable to deviations in wage rate,
rental return on capital and technology for each sector i. Aggregate pricing equation for










is the probability of price adjustment in the ith sector and lp is the share
of lagged general ination in wage indexation which is also set according to the Calvo
rule in this model. The equation shows that deviations in reoptimized price are caused by
deviations in lag of ination and current ination whereas the ratio of price adjusting and
non-adjusting rms remains constant if p is assumed to be monotonically index to general
ination level. The third equation below is the general level of ination which involves all









 ^t+1+ni=1  1  p;i  1  p;ip;i  1 + lp;i (mct  mct;p;i)
(4.3)
The general ination depends on past and future general ination as well as on sectoral




and sectoral marginal cost
mct;p;i:
When we want to study the impulse response function for the economy with dual
heterogeneity one can see that there will be an equation of type (4.2) for each sector which
depends upon general ination given in equation (4.3). However, when we look at equation
(4.3) it depends upon sectoral issues itself from both equations (4.1) and (4.2). So when
we aggregate across sectors equation (4.3) is non-linear, hence it does not yield a closed
form solution. As a result there is also no closed form solution for equation (4.1) and
equation (4.2)19. As the close form solutions cannot be obtained it is not possible to show
convergence of the impulse response function to a stationary distribution. Hence, we study
the problem numerically, i.e., we simulate the impulse response function and numerically
aggregate to get the ination rate and the aggregate output, and thus the aggregate impulse
response function20.
4.4.1 The Simulation Scheme
The general procedure for a DSGE model is to have aggregate equations for optimizing
variables of involved agents and then solve for the steady state. After that the model
is log linearized which then provides with the deviations useful in examining the impulse
responses. The impulse response function helps in pinning down the impact of an exogenous
shock on various variables of interest and shows the magnitude and its propagation over
19This problem is there in Carvalho (2006) as well, though there is no explicit discussion on this issue in
the paper and it seems to employ the same strategy of studying the problem as this chapter.
20When we do this, we have an additional issue to address, which is keeping track of how the impulse
response function changes over time (as they need not be stationary). This is explained in detail below.
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time in terms of deviation from the steady state. The simulation scheme established here
is designed to take on di¤erent price adjustment probability values at every point of time
throughout the propagation period of the impulse response which is set to at 40 periods
of time, i.e., equivalent to 40 quarters or 10 years. The purpose of such a long period is to
gauge su¢ ciently the long term e¤ect of dual heterogeneity in price adjustment frequency
to see if it is neutral and converges back to the steady state or remains deviated from it
even after such a long time. If the actual impulse response functions from the model are
compared with the ones with dual heterogeneity then some issues regarding the speed of
convergence can be pinned down.
The numerical simulation scheme is designed such that each sector i is uncertain about
its next period price adjustment probability at every point of time during the propagation
period of the shock however whatever probability it adjusts to is a random probability
within a certain probability density function pdf which is xed over the propagation period
of the impulse response. Since sectorsindividual adjusting probabilities add up through
an aggregator the economy wide aggregate price level is also subject to randomness within
the assumed pdf .
Illustration
In order to see how output deviates from its steady state in response to a one time exogenous
money shock the following matrix has been created:
266666666664
A1;1 A1;2 ::: ::: A1;n
A2;1 A2;2 ::: ::: A2;n
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
At;1 At;2 ::: ::: At;n
377777777775
The matrix above illustrates the general idea where At;n shows all possible impulse
response functions economy wide of t time length each and n is the number of sectors. It
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has been assumed that the n rms follow the same distribution regarding their frequencies
of price changes over the time period t and as a result there are nt possible impulse response
functions. Just for illustration a 2 x 2 case, in matrix form, would look like the following
matrix:
24 A1;1 A1;1 A1;2 A1;2
A2;1 A2;2 A2;1 A2;2
35
In the above matrix each column represents a single sectors impulse response function
sharing equal probability of realization with all other possible impulse response functions
that may be possible for that sector. To better explain and in a little detail this is how
the simulation process works: Suppose that there exists a certain distribution of price
adjustment probability in a two sector economy and within a shock lasting two periods
each sector can randomly have any value between 0 and 1 given that these two values
follow the assumed distribution. If the 2 x 2 example is expanded to 3 x 3 the state
space increases from 4 possible impulse response function outcomes to 27 possible impulse
response outcomes covering 3 time periods. Similarly for a 4 x 4 case there are 256 possible
impulse response functions of 4 time periods each. Since adjustment probability/speed
cannot fall below 0 making it important to consider only the positive distributions or those
with some transformation so that their values lie between 0 and 1.
Numerical Exercise of the Chapter
For rigor regarding encompassing true randomness a matrix of size 5040; i.e., it covers
50 sectors21 and 40 quarters has been chosen. The 50 impulse response functions have
price adjustment frequency heterogeneous both across sectors as well as over time where
21The need for 50 sectors arises from having an impulse response function spanning upto 40 periods of
time. Since the number of possible impulse response functions arising from a matrix of size 5040 is impossible
for a computer program to generate, we generated 50 impulse responses through a random number generator
from within an assumed distributions pdf and stacked them in columns. In order to attain randomness the
impulse responses now should be able to lie in straight columns as well as diagonally both on the left and
the right. The exact possible impulse response functions for a 5040 matrix is 9:094 9 1067:
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heterogeneity is assumed to follow a certain distribution. It is di¤erent from monotonic
heterogeneity which is based on ination indexation because under this numerical simu-
lation scheme price adjustment speed can go up and down or remain the same. So its
relation with ination is not obvious but now it depends upon several other issues some of
which have been mentioned above in the literature review.
We can then do numerical aggregation for the 50 impulse responses, considering each
for one sector, and as a result we can have an aggregated impulse response function for
the economy. In standard DSGE models the log-linearization process results in smooth
propagation of impulse response functions as well as the structure of the model is so
that convergence condition is always satised. However, its speed is not known. In our
numerical exercise, which avoids linearization due to non-trivial aggregation issues causing
no closed form solutions of the model, so both convergence and its speed are random and
non-indexed. This results in non-smooth impulse response functions.
We use three distributions to analyze the propagation path of heterogeneous impulse
responses both at rm level and in aggregation. We compare our results with those from the
standard DSGE model by Smets and Wouters (2007) with monotonic heterogeneous Calvo
pricing where the Calvo parameter is indexed with ination. However, to be consistent
we use the same distribution for generating the impulse response functions both for the
standard monotonic case and the dual heterogeneous case so that the comparison can be
credible.
Distributions
The simulation exercise is carried out separately for three distributions:
The rst distribution used is standard normal distribution. The standard normal
distribution is distributed between [-3 3] with mean at 0. Since price adjustment speed
cannot be negative it has been transformed to have a range between [0 1] with mean at
0.5. This transformation is such that the transformed distribution becomes positive but
retains all the properties of the standard normal distribution.
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Second is the uniform distribution between [0 1] with its standard properties.
The third distribution is termed as the positively skewed distribution. It is the
transformation of the normal distribution such that rst we restrict the range to be [-1 1]
with mean zero and secondly we add the negative part of the distribution to its positive part
in absolute term. This makes the new distribution positively skewed with a high kurtosis
and such skewness implies that more weight lies with lower values of price adjustment
probability or in other terms the distribution is biased in favor of more price stickiness.
4.5 Results
A one time negative money supply shock is given to the economy and the impulse response
functions are generated for analysis and comparison. Here the impact of the money supply
shock has been studied through its impact on steady state level of output, i.e., how much
the output deviates from its steady state level and how long it takes to converge back to the
same level. However, the di¤erence is that price adjustment speed has dual heterogeneity
within an assumed distribution. For comparison purposes, the sectoral impulse response
functions are numerically aggregated into a general impulse response function which is
then compared with the impulse response function coming from the models original index
price adjustment speed but now using the similar assumed distribution as in the dual
heterogeneous case.
4.5.1 Standard Normal Distribution
The rst simulation exercise assumes the distribution for price adjustment probability to
be standard normal which has been normalized to lie within [0, 1] with its mean at 0.5. In
order to have a fair idea how the sectoral impulse response function look, only few out of the
total 50 have been plotted below in gure 4a. The individual impulse response functions
have series of spikes throughout their propagation path and along with the existence of so
much heterogeneity both across sectors and over time they still manage to converge to the
steady state path on the X-axis by the end of 40 periods of time. The di¤erences from
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a standard impulse response are clear. The impulse response functions are quite volatile
throughout their propagation period of 40 quarters or 10 years due to the existence of dual
heterogeneity. A consistent volatile behavior of all the impulse response functions plotted
is enough to generalize that the rest of them out of 50, or any number of them which the
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Fig. 4.1: Sectoral Dual Heterogeneous Impulse Response Functions (Normal
Distribution)
It is observable that the heterogeneous nature of the impulse response functions would
create a band with an upper and lower bounds. If aggregation over all the impulse response
functions is done numerically then the Law of Large Numbers would hold. According to
the law, the average of the results obtained from a large number of trials should be close
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to the expected value, and will tend to become closer as more trials are performed. So in
gure 4.2 below is the aggregated impulse response function for the economy.
Fig. 4.2: Aggregated Impulse Response Functions (Normal Distribution)
Even though this is purely a theory based simulation exercise, it does capture empirical
essence as it has been mentioned in the beginning that there are several reasons for which
rms may have to follow heterogeneous pricing schemes and this also takes place when the
rms are facing shocks. These shocks generate dual heterogeneity and a¤ect the magnitude
and speed of convergence. In gure 4.2 the aggregate impulse response function of the
dual heterogeneous economy is compared with the standard impulse response function
generated from the model with ination indexation. Both the impulse response functions
have same distributions. Standard normal distribution provides with one impulse response
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for an economy which is then compared with its counterpart that has been obtained with
homogenous pricing. Surprisingly enough, dual heterogeneity results in relatively quicker
convergence of output to its steady state level as compared to its standard counterpart.
However, the aggregate impulse response function is not smooth but that is due to the
aggregation problem discussed earlier.
Another important observation is the magnitude of the impulse response function over
its propagation period. Figure 4.2 shows that not only the overall magnitude of the shock
in case of dual heterogeneity is relatively lower but also the speed of convergence becomes
relatively fast. It is not clear that true convergence is achieved but we can see that right
from the 25th quarter the impulse response function from the dual heterogeneous economy
stays very close to the steady state path. This is not true for the normal case as its impulse
response function reaches a stage of near convergence only till the 37th quarter.
So for the standard normal distribution dual heterogeneity in price adjustment fre-
quency is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis as well as the near rationality hy-
pothesis of Akerlof (where rms do not change prices in response to all stimuli) in that there
is convergence to the steady state. Here the presence of heterogeneity provides the sectors
with as much exibility as they might need to adjust prices, given all the circumstances af-
fecting prices, so that the real e¤ect of the negative money shock could be nullied as soon
as possible. As we allow for all degrees of price stickiness, the model generates outcomes
consistent with near-rational models.
Generalization of the above outcomes is not possible because there is no empirical
evidence regarding the actual distribution of prices, i.e., if they do follow the standard
normal distribution for USA. For that reason we check the outcomes with a couple of more
distributions below.
4.5.2 Uniform Distribution
Moving to the second of the three distributions to check robustness of the numerical simu-
lation exercise when dual heterogeneity exists, a uniform distribution is used. The uniform
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distribution lies between 0 and 1. Uniform distribution is unbiased because it assigns equal
weights on all values of price adjustment frequency both across sectors and over time. Fig-
ure 4.3 shows some of the 50 sector specic impulse response functions. It is evident that
the impulse response functions are almost similar in their appearance to the ones under
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Fig. 4.3: Sectoral Dual Heterogeneous Impulse Response Functions (Uniform
Distribution)
Here in gure 4.3 the band with an upper and a lower limit exists between which the
aggregate impulse response of an economy would lie. The Figure 4.3 is very similar to gure
4.1. The only apparent thing about the band is that it gives a very good idea regarding
the expected position and magnitude of the aggregate impulse response function. Such a
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yardstick is not possible in the standard case.
Fig. 4.4: Aggregated Impulse Response Functions (Uniform Distribution)
Similarly, as we numerically aggregated the sectoral impulse response functions in the
rst case, we aggregate the impulse response functions here and then in gure 4.4 compare
the outcome with the standard outcome. Now the di¤erence between the magnitude of the
shocks impact and speed of convergence are both clearly visible. The impulse response
function from the standard case not only has relatively more impact of the shock but this
persists over time. By the end of 40 periods the standard impulse response function has not
converged. On the other hand the impulse response function from the dual heterogeneous
case has relatively lower magnitude as the impact of the shock is concerned but also it has
converged at a faster rate relative to the standard case, i.e., after the 25th quarter it is
very near to the steady state path and has converged fully by the 35th quarter.
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Also, we note that the nature of the impulse response functions both sectoral and in
aggregation is not smooth, which is the common feature when closed form solutions do not
exist.
The above observation shows that when an unbiased distribution assigning equal weights
to all states whether across sectors or across time dual heterogenous price adjustment re-
sults in quicker than standard convergence verifying the results above in the rst case.
These results from the two distributions contradict with the results mentioned above in
the literature where heterogeneity is thought to generate more than standard persistence.
In order to further generalize a skewed distribution is used next to see whether the same
results hold or not. The average dynamics in case of the uniform distribution are very
di¤erent for time homogeneous and time heterogeneous cases.
4.5.3 Positively Skewed Distribution
As explained in the end of the previous section, positively skewed distribution originates
from the normal distribution where the negative part of the distribution is ipped and
placed over the positive part of the distribution. Doing so results in a very heavy tail on
the right hand side where the values for price adjustment frequency are low. As a result this
distribution is biased toward sectors with relatively more sticky prices. Figure 4.5 shows
that for the positively skewed distribution sectors exhibit impulse response functions quite
similar to the ones in gures 4.1 and 4.3. Figure 4.6 below shows the aggregate impulse
response function from the dual heterogeneous case are in line with the Law of Large
Numbers. But when compared to the standard case the magnitude due to the shocks
e¤ect is marginally higher than the standard case. The speed of convergence is almost the
same but since the magnitude is di¤erent from the standard case it takes just marginally
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Fig. 4.5: Sectoral Dual Heterogeneous Impulse Response Functions (Positive
Distribution)
This exercise shows that in this case with the skewed distribution the result regarding
magnitude and speed of convergence are di¤erent as compared to the rst two unbiased
distributions. This result then contributes in a way that generalizing the results regarding
dual heterogeneity or any sort of heterogeneity regarding magnitude of the impact of shock
on output need further research.
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Fig. 4.6: Aggregated Impulse Response Functions (Positive Distribution)
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter is an extension of Carvalho (2006). The introduction of time heterogeneity
along with sectoral heterogeneity incorporates heterogeneity of dual nature in the frequency
for price adjustments. The aggregation problem still exists due to the non-trivial nature
of the problem where there are no closed form solutions for equations of the model22. This
paper is supportive of the view that using distributions of price adjustment frequencies can
be useful is studying the stylized facts of the pricing behavior as well as incorporating them
in the standard models can improve the outcomes regarding size of the impact of shocks
on real variables as well as how fast they converge to their steady states.
22Solving the model, along with heterogeneity, for the aggregates is still the an open area of research.
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The setting up of a numerical simulation scheme is a contribution of this chapter in
itself because the papers like Carvalho (2006) and Alvarez and Buriel (2010) are not so
clear about their aggregation processes. The simulation scheme here tries to mimic what
an aggregation scheme would have done if it would have existed.
The other conclusion is that we generate results that are supportive of the idea that
persistence can be explained through modeling distributions as well as there is a lot more
to be done when it comes to generalizing the results. This is in line with Dixon and Kara
(2010).
The last result, regarding convergence, is at odds with the literature in this area of
research. We show very intuitively and with more heterogeneity in price adjustments as
compared to Carvalho (2006) and Alvarez and Buriel (2010) that persistence is lower as
compared to the outcomes of the standard model under a similar shock. The distribution
matters because when we used the skewed distribution the result regarding persistence
altered marginally in favor of the standard case. So, if the actual distribution of the price
adjustment frequencies is known then it can be seen quite accurately how the propagation
of the impulse response function takes place. Also the use of Law of Large Numbers in our
case results in a very stable aggregate impulse response function despite being numerically
aggregated over a large number of highly uctuating sectoral impulse response functions.
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In a production economy, we assume that there are m heterogeneous products denoted by
index i 2 f1; 2; :::;mg. The household utility level depends on aggregate consumption c








This implies that there is constant elasticity of substitution (CES) among heterogeneous
goods . We consider a static economy at the current moment. Given the total expendi-
ture (denoted as Ct) of ci;t and the price distribution fPig on fcig, the following budget
constraint should be satised:
mi=1Pi;tci;t = Ct (A.2)
The household is facing a distribution problem: How to distribute total expenditure opti-
mally across di¤erent products? The problem can be phrased as a maximization problem,
maximizing (A:1) subject to (A:2). The optimization problem can be solved by Lagrangian







+ t (Ct   mi=1Pi;tci;t)
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Since the utility optimization problem is invariant to any monotonically increasing trans-
formation of utility function, we consider the following equivalent Lagrange instead:
L = mi=1ci;t + t (Ct   mi=1Pi;tci;t)
The Lagrangian multiplier t represents the shadow price of Ct 23. The rst order condi-
tions with respect to ci;t and t:
@L
@ci;t
= c 1i;t   tPi;t = 0
@L
@t
= Ct   mi=1Pi;tci;t = 0 (A.4)
Assuming (j = 1; 2; :::::;m) but (j 6= i) and (j = m  1)gives:
c 1j;t   tPj;t = 0 (A.5)








Now using the assumption for j we get:
Ct = 
m
j=1Pj;tcj;t + Pi;tci;t (A.7)









23Consider the utility function u
 fcigmi=1 = mi=1ci with respect to the Lagrangian problem. If you solve
for its indirect utility as a function of Ct and pi, denoted as v(Ct; pi), then t = @v=@Ct:
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; which when solved in ac-



































which implies that the expenditure share of ci:t (that is Pi;tci;t=Ct) depends solely on the
relative price of commodity i (that is Pi;t=Pt). Second, the demand elasticity of ci;t with
respect to its relative price is = (1  ). Third, if we consider the aggregate consumption
as in (A:10) and express its level in terms of total consumption expenditure Ct and the
aggregate price index Pt, then it means that:
ct (Ct;Pt) = ici;t (Ct; Pi;t; Pt)
















































k (1  )k @t+k
@qk;t+k
Qt;t+k = 0































Because qk;t+k = q0;tQt;t+k and ck;t = ~q
 1=(1 )
































































 0;tct + Et1k=1






  0;tct + Et
1
k=1
k (1  )kQ 1=(1 )t;t+k  k;t+kct+k
ct + Et1k=1
k (1  )kQ =(1 )t;t+k ct+k
:















k (1  )kQ =(1 )t+k (ct+k=ct)
That is, the rm sets price as a markup over discounted measures of costs and demand, as





























Data set on various variables and their sources used for calibration of the parameters for
USA.
NAME UNIT
Ination 1+ination rate (from CPI).
Rate of Return 1+Rate of Return (3-mths treasury bills).
Wage (Avg. Working hours/Quarter)*(Wage/hour).
Per Capita Consumption (Personal consumption/population.)$
Standardized Work Hours Hours divided by 2184.
Shopping Time From Households maximization scheme.
Leisure Time From Households maximization scheme.
NAME/ SOURCE MEAN S.D RANGE
Ination/ FRB, St. Louis 1.01 0.006 1.002-1.03
Rate of Return/ FRB, St. Louis 1.05 0.025 0.99-1.14
Wage/ FRB, St. Louis $3543 $1655 S1159-$6629
Per Capita Consumption/ FRB, St. Louis $3123 $2095 $534-$7996
Standardized Work Hours/ 0.194 0.008 0.185-0.213
Shopping Time/ 0.039 0.0094 0.0236-0.0592
Leisure Time/ 0.766 0.0045 0.755-0.744
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Appendix D
The Objective Function for Choosing  in the
Steady State
The value functions of the price adjusting and non-adjusting producers are given below
respectively:
v = (q0) +  [v  A] + (1  )vf (q1)
vf (qk) = (qk) +  [v  A] + (1  )vf (qk+1)
The second equation implies that:
1k=1(1  )kvf;k = 1k=1(1  )k(qk) + (1  ) [v  A]






























1   [v  A] 
(1  )
1   vf;1
So, in the steady state,
v  A = [(q0) A] +  [v  A] + (1  )vf (q1)
Therefore,
(1  ) [v  A] = (q0) A+ (1  )vf;1 (D.2)
Putting (D:2) into (D:1), we obtain the following expression:




k=0(1  )k(qk;  ; y) 
A
1   (D.3)




k    q 1=(1 )k

y and qk =
 kq1; hence:
1k=0(1  )k(qk) = 1k=0(1  )k
h















The explicit expression of the objective function is equivalent to:
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Construction of Figures in Chapters 1, 2 and 3
The gures in chapters 1, 2 and 3 are constructed using matlab. Since there are similarities
in these gures, we intend to explain their general consruction which can lead to di¤erent
output under di¤erent parameter values. It is worthwhile to mention here that in chapter
4 the simulation scheme has been well explained making it quite clear how the impulse
response functions have been generated and averaged using the Law of Large Numbers.
E.1 Ination and Wage Relationship
We equate two equations together in order to get the wage rate. Under the standard case
for Calvo pricing, both in chapter 1 and 2 we do the same. The rst equation is the ination
and zero vintage price trade-o¤:
q0 =
 













1   (1  ) 1  g
1   (1  ) 1(1 ) g
!
We take the ratio of the two equations so that such a value for w, i.e., the wage rate is
obtained that can equate the two equations above to each other. The ratio is given below























The graph is straight forward when value of price adjustment speed  is xed. Varying
values of long run ination would give di¤erent values for wage rate that can equate the






























E.2 Ination and Relative Price q0
With wage rate pinned down the optimal pricing equation is used to pin down the relative









1   (1  ) 1  g
1   (1  ) 1(1 ) g
!
and it can be seen that the value of q0 changes with changes in w;  and :





















E.3 Ination and Output
As wage rate and relative price get known then it comes to the level of corresponding
output. The output can be pinned down by equating labor supply and labor demand in
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such a way that their di¤erence becomes zero at any given level of long run ination 












1  (1  ) 11 
Since both of the above equations have output or consumption c in them, any such value
of c that can make the di¤erence between the two equations zero would be the optimal level
of output or optimal consumption in our models of Calvo pricing. Under Taylor pricing












E.4 Ination and Labor Demand
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E.5 Ination and Price Adjustment Speed Trade-o¤
We can use labor demand and labor supply to pin down the trade-o¤ between long run
ination  and price adjustment speed : We solve the optimal pricing equation for the
wage rate w=a where a = 1 and put the expression in the labor supply equation also
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1  (1  ) 11 
1A
That value of price adjustment speed  corresponding to long-term ination level 
that can clear the labor market, i.e., equates labor supply and labor demand is the optimal
price adjustment speed at the given ination level. Under exibility of price adjustment
speed there is a long run trade-o¤ between ination and price adjustment speed, i.e., price
adjustment speed comoves with long-run levels of ination. We do the similar process
under Taylor pricing using labor supply and labor demand under the Taylor pricing setup.
E.6 Fixed Price Adjustment Cost A
Under Calvo pricing the value function, or the objective function in presence of xed price
adjustment cost A, for the rm is given by:



























1   (1  ) 1  g
1   (1  ) 1(1 ) g
!
The expression obtained is equated zero, hence, we can estimate the value for A at
steady state level, i.e., when long run ination  = 1:01 and price adjustment speed
 = 0:25: Other parametersvalues at steady state level also get pinned down by utilizing
























264  1  q =(1 )0
1  (1  ) 1 
2     11  q 1=(1 )0
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   1= (1  ) q
 1=(1 ) 1
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The estimation of A under Taylor pricing has been explained in detail in chapter 3.
E.7 Relationships and Trade-o¤s in presence of A
The relationships of long run ination  with wage rate, labor demand, output, relative
price and price adjustment speed in the presence of xed price adjustment speed have been
obtained by utilizing the f_solve option in Matlab. We solve three equations together in
order to get all the relavant relationships.
130
The rst equation comes from the above section, i.e., the di¤erenciated objective func-
tion from which we estimated the value of A: The second equation equates optimal price q0
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1  (1  ) 11 
= 0
By varying the values for level of long run ination  we get our desired relationships
and the trade-o¤ between  and :
Under Taylor pricing we do the same, i.e., use the equations for the the value function,
which in this case is much simpler due to the discrete nature of T , labor market and optimal
price, to generate the required relationships.
